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THE ASSEMBLY AND AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY

Evanston as a place-name is now history, written large in the memorable columns of ecumenical discussion and effort along with Stockholm, Lausanne, Edinburgh, Oxford, and Amsterdam. Its permanent achievement can be assayed only after the passage of time but its corollary effects in the form of influence on American religious thought may even now be estimated.

Some immediate implications of the Assembly are readily apparent because they are not the results of merely two weeks in August of this year of the Lord but have been slowly cumulative in the blood-stream of American Christianity. In fact, the infiltration of the British and Continental theological tradition antedates by many years the Assembly and even its proximate preparatory program of discussion, reading, and preaching on a country-wide basis.

The one new, radically new, experience was, perhaps, the impact of the representatives of the Younger Churches. Their single-minded missionary commitment and drive made concrete for many of us in this country the realities of the world-situation and Christianity's struggle for a significant role in the current revolution. This is not to say that the mere presence of our brethren in Christ from Asia and Africa seemed to bring the problems any nearer solution. The issues, however, were emphatically underlined and proclaimed in a dimension of depth.

It would appear that in three respects many delegates from the American churches found themselves in an unfamiliar, bewildering, and sometimes uncongenial atmosphere. This was by no means true of all or, especially, of those most ably representative of the ecumenical movement on this continent. Nevertheless, there was discernible more than an undercurrent of uneasiness and resistance around at least three points.

First was the statement of the theme of Christian Hope. The confusion of the evolutionary hope in terms of natural and historical processes, characterizing the "scientific" humanism of the western world, with the theological concept of hope is too deep-rooted to yield easily to a simple biblical restatement of Christ as the Hope of the World. Moreover, the effort to delineate hope within an eschatological framework was widely misunderstood as a reversion to biblical literalism or a movement, all too familiar to Americans, in the direction of millenarianism. It was, as pointed out by Reinhold Niebuhr, both too naive for the sophisticated and too sophisticated for the naive. The result was that an aura of unreality surrounded much of the discussion.

Secondly, there was a feeling rather generally shared by the Americans that the goal or "ideal" of church unity had been sold for a mess of theological pottage. The view persists, despite all disclaimers by its committees and officers, that the World Council's primary and even exclusive *raison d'être* should be ecclesiastical unification. The World Council's interpretation of itself in the apparently more modest role of catalytic agent and instrument for the reunion of Christendom is, for some reason not as yet clear, unsatisfactory to large numbers of American Christians. It is regarded by them as an expression of "diversionary tactics" rather than a part of the grand strategy leading to the *Una Sancta*. Probably the American doubts are due somewhat to a native suspicion of all theological discussion in line with the popular tendency to deprecate the "theoretical" or "abstract" in favor of getting things done rapidly and efficiently.

Thirdly, the political, social, and economic criticism offered by our brethren from overseas was not whole-heartedly welcome. Just as they were thought to be overly conservative theologically, so they were believed to be too "leftist" or "collectivist" in their social views. To many of our countrymen there seems to be no viable alternative to "free enterprise" and the "American way." And the inner meaning of Christian prophetic judgment tends to escape the grasp of all too many on this side of the Atlantic.

It was nothing less than miraculous that the foregoing tension-points were not wholly disruptive of the Assembly. That such was not the case was due not to difficulties being passed over in indifference nor to the techniques of high diplomacy but to a profound sense of vocation, indeed of penitence. Truly, there was a deeply shared experience of a common witness, of *koinonia*. Within the total ecumenical encounter at Evanston there were indications of the leaven of the Kingdom.

ALDEN DREW KELLEY

JERUSALEM AND ATHENS

By E. LA B. CHERDONNIER

Barnard College

An ancient question in the history of thought has become even more acute in our time: What is the relation between the truth of Christianity and that of other philosophies? Old and New Testament scholarship have made it impossible to ignore the cleavage between the biblical conceptions of God, man, and human destiny, and the corresponding conceptions in most academic philosophy. Recognition of this difference has led theologians both past and present to approach the problem of "revelation and reason" with a plausible but fateful assumption: that since the God of the prophet differs so decisively from that of the professional philosopher, the truth of the Bible is therefore incompatible with human reason. Once this assumption is granted, the issue between Christian and non-Christian world-views can only be stated in terms of two equally awkward alternatives: either the Bible at the expense of reason, or reason at the expense of the Bible. Either the theologian must mortify his intellect before a written authority, or he must allow human reason to sit in judgment upon the Word of God.

This dilemma will continue to plague theologians as long as they accept the assumption upon which it rests, the incompatibility of revelation and reason. The standard way to challenge this assumption has traditionally been to deny any fundamental difference between biblical and other metaphysics. Since current scholarship has rendered this argument obsolete, the present article will renew the challenge from the opposite direction. It will urge that the Bible's deviation from other metaphysics is a positive philosophical asset. If these points of divergence, far from proving the Bible irrational, can establish instead its intellectual superiority, theology may yet find a way out of the predicament which otherwise confronts it.

I. IMPASSE

The history of Christian thought has been governed by two opposing schools, corresponding to the horns of the dilemma mentioned above. The strength of each consists partly in the weakness of the other. The

first, from Tertullian through Martin Luther to Karl Barth, actually seems to revel in the mortification of the intellect: "I believe because it is impossible." "Reason is the devil's whore."

The second school, perceiving that the first invariably makes use of the very rationality it disparages, seeks instead to demonstrate the wisdom of Christianity. Its method, however, is to argue that, after all, the Bible and other philosophies are only saying the same "truth" in different ways. In order to do so, it must obscure what is distinctive in the biblical categories. The mystical tradition, especially (if not explicitly or even consciously), dissolves them into mere symbolical pre-figurations of some supposedly more "respectable" truth. The net result of such efforts is to render Christianity superfluous.

One can sympathize with both positions: with those who are determined to guard the uniqueness of the Bible against absorption into an alien metaphysic, and with those who understand that a Christianity which is not communicable is no Christianity at all. But one can scarcely deny that together they constitute an impasse which has prevented theology from solving its own most urgent problem.

Is this impasse necessary, or can it be avoided? The only way to avoid it is to challenge the fatal assumption which underlies both schools, the one more obviously, the other more subtly: that because there are differences between biblical categories and those of other philosophies, the biblical ones are *ipso facto* not rational. Once this is assumed, it is no wonder that reason must either be defied in the name of Christianity, or that biblical categories must be distorted in order to appease some other metaphysic. Is it possible to acknowledge the obvious differences which do exist, without concluding that revelation and reason are therefore incompatible? On one and only one condition could this be done: only if, by the rigorous standards which philosophy itself acknowledges, the metaphysic implied in the Bible could establish a more legitimate claim to "rationality" than its competitors—if it should prove to hold the key to what philosophy has so long sought in vain.

In short the way to preserve the uniqueness of the Bible is not to deny its reasonableness. Such a denial merely absolves Christianity's competitors of the responsibility for philosophically substantiating their own gods as against the God of the Bible. The way to preserve the uniqueness of the Bible is precisely to demonstrate its *superior* reasonableness. Not, however, by urging that it agrees with Plato or Aristotle, but by showing that at points of divergence between their conceptions of the divine and the Lord of Hosts, it is the latter who holds

the philosophical advantage. In this way theology might find a third alternative to the two horns of the dilemma which has so long beset it.

Like the one horn, this alternative would emphasize the difference between biblical and unbiblical world-views, but without concluding that revelation is therefore anti-rational. Like the other horn, it would argue that Christianity is indeed the best philosophy, but without sacrificing the characteristic biblical categories. Instead, it would demonstrate that the distinctive biblical metaphysic has no need either to retreat into splendid isolation, or to surrender in timid compliance, when confronted by rival conceptions of God, man, and human destiny.

Such a program would involve frank endorsement by the theologian of the enduring contributions of the Greek genius to human thought; namely: clarity, coherence, consistency; an open-minded readiness to consider on its merits any question, free from the dictation of *any* authority; the willingness to accept the burden of proof for one's statements and not simply to assert them gratuitously; and most important of all, the corresponding willingness to accept responsibility for the logical implications of all that one says. In a word, the theologian must be prepared to meet all the requirements of systematic thinking.

At this point the theologian concerned to safeguard biblical categories from subversion by Greek presuppositions may suspect that a Trojan horse has been smuggled past the gates of Jerusalem. But the simple truth is that one can ill afford to deny any of these principles. Every attempt to do so implicitly presupposes them, and thereby invites the philosopher to tie a certain kind of biblical theology into knots. Moreover, a second glance at the foregoing philosophical canons reveals that nothing substantial, nothing involving *content*, has been conceded to Greece. On the contrary, all these rules of thought are purely formal: they refer to the *manner* of thinking alone, and are easily converted into adverbs: *clearly*, *coherently*, *systematically*, and so forth. They are the criteria by which any philosophy, whatever its content, must be tested. Since it is only in matters of content that differences between biblical and other philosophies attain any significance, the adoption of these principles need occasion no alarm.

It is the present purpose to show that in addition to these merely formal rules of procedure, secular philosophies have often introduced a further, unproved, and highly debatable assumption as to content: a dogma concerning the nature of the real itself. It may even happen that the philosopher will be unwilling to discuss this assumption, to the extent even of pinning the label "unphilosophical" on all who refuse to

accept it uncritically (on authority). Such an accusation is itself "unphilosophical." For the test of an adequate philosophy is whether it satisfies these systematic criteria, and not whether it satisfies the assumptions of the individual philosopher. The theologian consequently need not be intimidated by cries of "unphilosophical activities". If he will scrutinize critically the philosopher's own dogma as to content, he may well discover that the labels "philosophical" and "unphilosophical" could properly be reversed. For if God is indeed the Lord of all creation, then there follows a fateful consequence: a philosophy based upon a false assumption concerning the nature of the real (God) will ultimately be betrayed by the tell-tale symptom of self-contradiction. Conversely, only a philosophy whose assumption about the real is correct can hope to satisfy its own criterion of consistency. The Christian therefore enters the philosophical arena confident that if the formal requirements of Athens are to be met, the content must come from Jerusalem.

II. PHILOSOPHY AGAINST ITSELF

The proposal is to inquire whether biblical or some other philosophy will better withstand testing by the criteria of Athens. As an experimental illustration, this test will be applied to one of the most crucial points in the content of any philosophy: its conception of the real and the true. The respective positions on this point held by the Bible, on the one hand, and what historically has been the most important kind of "religious philosophy," on the other, will be critically compared.

Some theologians may fear that the correlation of the real and the true, assumed in the preceding paragraph, already capitulates to Platonic philosophy. To this there are two replies. First, the attempt to deny the correlation of the real and the true always ends in self-contradiction. For if the real is not the true, then it will ultimately claim a validity over against whatever else is postulated as true. That is, it will constitute a "truth which is not the truth." This is the point at which Plato will make sport of alternative philosophies, whether Aristotelian, empirical, or positivistic. Secondly, this correlation of the real and the true is formal only. The proper bone of contention between the Bible and Plato (including so-called "Christian Platonism") concerns the question of *content*: of the *nature* of truth and reality. The following pages will subject this issue to critical examination.

The reasoning by which so many philosophers of Platonic stamp have arrived at their conclusion concerning the nature of the real is

plausible enough: if we are to know anything, then the object of our knowledge, the real, must be "rational". It must conform to the requirements of reason; but if it is not alien to the canons of reason, it cannot be different from them. And if not different, then, according to the momentous conclusion of idealist philosophy, reality and reason are the same. In Hegel's formulation, "The real is the rational, and the rational is the real;" or in Parmenides', "Thought and Being are One."

To the further question, "If the rational is the real, then what exactly do you mean by 'rational'?" the answer is evident: the rational is the logical. The most real is, therefore, that which enjoys the greatest logical priority. As it is frequently put, the real is "not the sum total of everything that is, but the precondition, the 'ground', of all that is." This is the answer which this kind of philosophy gives to the question which it shares with the Bible: the most real is the logically most prior. The name generally given to this *ens realissimum* is "Being" (*esse, auto to on*). In the words of a distinguished representative of this school, Paul Tillich, "Being" is the one non-symbolic word for God because it "precedes in logical dignity" all other designations.¹

As an illustration of what is entailed by this logical priority, one can apply it to two spheres of experience, the temporal process and the multiplicity of objects in the physical world. Apply this principle to the former, and it follows logically that in order for there to be change at all, there must first be "something which changes" as its precondition. "That which truly is" (Being) is not change, but the "something which underlies all change," the immutable behind all transience. In Platonic terms, "Being is prior to Becoming."

When the same principle is applied to the "world of ten thousand things," as the Chinese say, it is evident that they, too, fail to command logical priority, either individually or collectively. For as long as there are even two separate entities, there are two different "reals" and, consequently, two different "truths"—a self-contradiction. Logically prior to all plurality, therefore, is the one "reality" which transcends all multiplicity. Thus plurality can provide no resting place for logic, but goads it on and on until it comes to rest in "the one behind the many," capitalized "the One" by mystics like Plotinus. It is consequently perfectly consistent and even necessary for upholders of this view to insist that God cannot be "a being besides other beings;" for then the

¹See C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall, ed., *The Theology of Paul Tillich* (New York: Macmillan, 1952) Section III, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," p. 339.

"really real" would have to be that which includes and transcends the lesser totality of God-plus-other-beings (a purely quantitative conception, incidentally, of God).

The final issue of this line of argument is that God may not stand in relation to anything else. If He did, this would at once differentiate Him from it; and this in turn sets up a duality of God-and-the-world, thereby requiring a "higher" reality which is prior to both. By the same token, there can be no differentiation in God, for any differentiation again presupposes the plurality of differentia. Consequently, it is also perfectly consistent and necessary to maintain, as the mystic does, that "sin is separation," since separation is precisely the (to him) abhorrent process of differentiation. This is why "Christian mysticism" can never satisfactorily distinguish between creation and the fall.

Such is the god of this kind of philosophy: as Socrates says in Plato's *Phaedrus*, a "colorless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to the mind."² It is immutable and therefore static; unrelated and unconditioned; impassive (for to care is to care *about something* and therefore to stand in relation to it, and this would presuppose plurality). For the same reason it is without will or purpose, and also for an additional reason: purpose implies that God wills something which he lacks, and this would in turn imply an incompleteness and imperfection in God (again a quantitative conception of perfection). Hence from Plato to the present, scarcely a philosopher has been willing to attribute will or purpose to God, except when speaking mythologically. And finally, when the chain reaction set off by the foregoing presuppositions is followed through consistently, God must be beyond the distinction between good and evil. For this distinction presupposes a duality, whereas the divine must be the unity which underlies all duality, including that between good and evil. A vivid picture of such a god is drawn by a contemporary philosopher of art, who shows its significance for the field of sculpture:

Zeus, so Pheidias would have argued, must not be caught in his passing moods or actions as the benevolent, fatherly or as the angry, thundering god, nor even as the victim of incidental light and color. He should be Zeus simply, unrelated, abstract, and absolute; not in his outer, casual appearance, but in his very idea and

²Phaedrus, 247.

essence, of which his appearance could just be a meaningless shadow—a shadow's shade, Plato would say.²

How radically such a god differs from the God of the Bible is quite obvious when its properties are listed together. Yet Anglican theology, especially, has not always kept this difference firmly in sight. Aware of the dangers in Protestant theologies which seek to preserve the uniqueness of the Bible at the expense of rationality, Anglicans frequently succumb to the other danger, and try to reconcile the Bible with reason on terms laid down by Platonic philosophy. Though Anglican practice is often superior to its theory, and can probably count on the Prayer Book to save it from some of its theological tendencies, nevertheless it might well ponder the unbridgeable gulf which separates the god of so much speculative metaphysics from the Lord of the Church.

Thus far, the argument has avoided questions of validity, confining itself to an exposition of the attributes of the philosopher's god, and of the reasoning behind them. So plausible is this reasoning that to challenge it would seem to court disaster. But there is one remaining question to put to this school of philosophy which, when exploited, can shake its very foundations. The real, or Being, equated with the rational, was reached by differentiating it from whatever failed to meet the requirement of logical priority. Now the question is: What is the status of the irrational, and particularly the vital, aspects of experience?

The only consistent reply, viz. that they have no share in Being and therefore do not exist, has in fact been made by most Oriental philosophy. Vedanta, for example, teaches that the whole world of time, space, and matter is an illusion (*maya*). If this were so, however, an awkward consequence would follow: if only the rational existed, there would be no difference between the teachings of the wise philosopher and the ignorant opinions of the many, and the whole philosophic enterprise would be absurd. The ultimate outcome of philosophy would be a self-defeating snare and delusion, and its highest wisdom would be to know nothing at all, as is in fact advocated both by Taoism and by Western mystics who subscribe to Nicolas of Cusa's *docta ignorantia*.

Owing perhaps to this difficulty, as well as to a healthy admixture of common sense, many Western philosophers have been reluctant to pronounce the everyday world unreal. But this reluctance provides no solution to their dilemma. For they, too, must give the non-logical

²Curt Sachs, *The Commonwealth of Art* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1946) p. 257.

aspects of experience, excluded from Being by definition, the label of "Non-Being." When they try to maintain that this irrational Non-Being does in some sense exist, they are forced into the inconsistency of saying that Non-Being has Being! This admission entails the conclusion, as catastrophic as it is astonishing, that since Being "somehow" includes Non-Being, the two must in the last analysis be the same.

To the unbiased analyst, philosophers like Hegel and Heidegger, to mention only two who have endorsed this proposition in so many words,⁴ thus present a curious spectacle. From what appeared to be the pinnacle of philosophical respectability they are suddenly forced to repudiate the very means by which they climbed there: the distinction of the rational (Being) from the irrational (Non-Being). At first separated from each other as white and black, these two categories are now blithely declared to be the same. At one stroke, consistency, clarity, and all that philosophy was supposed to stand for are abruptly revoked. The mystics quite explicitly direct their attack against reason itself. For them, the logical distinctions inherent in the reasoning process are sufficient proof of its "fallen" nature. By their standards, rational discrimination is branded "divisive." It only aggravates the degeneration of primordial unity into the manifold world of space and time. This incompatibility of reason with the mystic's goal is expressed by the Chinese philosopher Chuang-Tse: "Returning to their Root without knowing it, the result will be a formless whole which will never be cut up. To know it is to cut it up."⁵ Does this disparagement of reason have a familiar ring? Was it not the major premise of the "anti-rationalist" school from which the philosopher originally dissociated himself? By a strange irony, when the philosopher gets to the end of his road, he encounters Karl Barth coming the other way. They shake hands, and exchange the salutation, "Reason is the devil's whore."

These strictures against reason are accompanied by an assault upon truth as well. For if Being and Non-Being correlate respectively with truth and falsehood; and if Being and Non-Being are the same; then there is no distinction between falsehood and truth! Martin Heidegger, for example, declares that since "untruth must derive from the essence of truth," one must therefore "dedicate untruth to oneself."⁶ The same

⁴*Existence and Being*: Selected essays by Martin Heidegger; translated by R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick (London: Vision Press, 1949) p. 377.

⁵Lin Yutang, trans. and ed., *The Wisdom of Lao-tse* (New York, Random House: Modern Library, 1948) p. 113.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 337, 347. Also Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Neomarius Verlag, 1949) p. 299.

point is made by Nicolas of Cusa in his doctrine of the coincidence of opposites, which extends even to the "coincidence" of truth and falsehood. This position has been reaffirmed only recently by W. T. Stace, whose numerous references illustrate beautifully how the philosopher is obliged finally to declare, with Jacob Boehme, that "the Eternal Yes and the Eternal No lie together in the ultimate nature of God." This consideration moves him quite frankly to glory in self-contradiction. It prompts another contemporary author to argue that the use of certain terms is justified by their ambiguity!⁸

How does the philosopher get into such a plight? How does it happen that defenders of the principles of Athens, the passion for truth and the discipline of rational clarity, are driven by the inner logic of their own primary assumptions deliberately to cultivate ambiguity, renounce reason, and obscure the distinction between falsehood and truth? To the Bible, this question is no enigma at all. In fact, had its chief interest been speculative philosophy, the Bible would surely have prophesied just such a predicament. It would have sounded the alarm the moment the philosopher made his fateful decision concerning the nature of the real. When he converted the mere *rules* of thought into the *content* of his system ("the rational is the real"), in that moment he unwittingly fell under the dominion of a false god. Deified reason, true to the hallmark of all false gods, visits the victims of its empty promises with cruel disillusionment. Far from fulfilling the philosopher's dream of a consistent system, it drives him instead to disparage logic and truth. The biblical understanding of the "dynamics of idolatry" thus finds the strongest corroboration in the field of philosophy. *He who deifies the canons of philosophy, created by God and discovered by Athens, will be driven inexorably to violate them.*

The Bible not only understands how the philosopher is tricked into pulling the rug out from under himself; it also provides a metaphysical context invulnerable to such embarrassment. Since for it the real is not reason but its Author, it never regards some imagined "undifferentiated unity" as a "divine standard" from which to impugn logical discrimination as "divisive." What an irony that the supposedly irrational Bible, by delivering the philosopher from a mistaken conception of the real

⁸Stace, W. T. *Time and Eternity* (Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 158. See also Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (Yale University Press, 1952), p. 23.

⁹Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951) pp. 156, 203.

(God), can free him for the single-minded pursuit of the systematic rigor which he at first endorsed!

This is so clearly the end of the road for this particular kind of philosophy that one wonders how it has managed not only to survive for so long, but in fact to maintain a hegemony in its field. The explanation is again provided by the biblical insight into the inner workings of idolatry. Perceiving that false gods invariably entangle their followers in self-deception, biblical metaphysics is not surprised when philosophers, instead of acknowledging their obvious inconsistencies and seeking to rectify them, actually seek to justify them. As an illustration of this phenomenon, the following paragraphs will examine three of the arguments commonly urged by philosophers in their own extenuation. As might be expected, all three prove to be self-defeating. Each one violates the canons of philosophy laid down by Athens. Whenever this occurs, Athens invariably has her revenge. For every departure from these rules of thought eventually runs afoul of the philosopher's own peculiar nemesis: self-contradiction.

The first such tactic to which the philosopher may have recourse is to insist that what has been refuted by the foregoing argument is nothing but a straw man, that he fails to recognize himself in this account of his difficulties. The specific point at which this charge is often made concerns the meaning of the term "Being." "Being," he avers, has been far too narrowly and statically defined. Actually, it is a much more inclusive term—in fact the most inclusive, excluding neither the dynamic aspect of reality nor indeed the biblical categories themselves. Far from constituting a defense, however, this argument turns out in fact to be an admission which strengthens the indictment. For it is unhappily all too true that the term "Being" has been applied in at least three different senses, often by the same philosopher, and with little or no attempt to distinguish between them. There is, first, "Being" in the strict, Platonic sense indicated above: changeless, undifferentiated unity. Many philosophers, however, in search of something more impressive than this static, innocuous essence, have turned instead to what was excluded from it: the irrational, chaotic, dynamic aspects of reality, which had been lumped together as Non-Being. This Non-Being is then held to be more real than mere Being (Boehme, Heidegger, Berdyaev). In the words of the *Tao-Teh-Ching*, "The things of this world come from Being, and Being from Non-Being."⁹ But since the term "Being" ought properly to be reserved for the most real,

⁹*Tao-Teh-Ching*, 40.

it is evident that the application of it to immutable, undifferentiated unity actually constituted a misnomer. Consequently it is now appropriated and applied to the dynamic—a sense precisely the opposite of its original use. Thus the philosopher once again finds himself in the unenviable position of saying that Non-Being is Being. This is the second sense in which the term "Being" may be used, a sense which allows the philosopher either to mean what he says, or the opposite of what he says, in sublime indifference to the most elementary rules of rational discourse.

In addition, to complicate matters still further, there is a third meaning of "Being". If reality is divided into rational and irrational components (*yang* and *yin*), then the "most real" of all, that which alone deserves the designation "Being," could not be either member of this duality, but would have to be the "reality" which includes them both. This explains how the philosopher can get himself into the position of saying that Being includes both Being and Non-Being (where "Being" is used first in this last-mentioned sense, and then in the narrower, Platonic sense). As Paul Tillich expresses it, "Being 'embraces' itself and Non-Being."¹⁰

Armed with these three different meanings of the same word, the philosopher can keep the neophyte guessing indefinitely in a sort of metaphysical shell game, in which it is never permitted to lift the shells to see which one conceals the meaning of the moment. The point, however, is not how many people are fooled, but whether or not the methods are legitimate—whether the indiscriminate use of the same word with several incompatible meanings can be reconciled with the Greek canons of clarity and consistency, or whether instead Kierkegaard was right in branding such procedure as "solving problems by superscription."

Finally, to defend "Being" on the ground that it includes everything is surely an eloquent way of testifying against it. For philosophy proceeds by logical sequences, by making distinctions on the basis of logical compatibility or incompatibility. If it is now suddenly granted that these distinctions are all to be abandoned and swallowed up in

¹⁰Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be*, p. 34; cf. also p. 180. Translated into the language of everyday human concerns, this equivocal position obscures the distinction between life and death themselves. Tillich not only can, but must, in all consistency, speak with Nietzsche of the "death which belongs to life" (*ibid.*, p. 34; cf. also pp. 32-35, 179-181). As another contemporary writer puts it, "Death and decay are aspects of life and growth, though from the opposite side" (Curt Sachs, *op. cit.*, p. 261). It requires no Nietzsche to spell out the implications of this doctrine.

"Being," then one wonders by what right such a philosophy professes to speak in the tradition of Athens. Its own principle of logical discrimination might have been a warning to it that the final criterion of reality would not be merely quantitative and *inclusive*, but rather, as the Bible never forgets, qualitative and *exclusive*.

A second riposte which the philosopher is sometimes tempted to try is the contention that it is really more profound to raise problems than to answer them, that the confusions of his philosophy only reflect the bewildering nature of reality itself—in a word, that the more obscure a metaphysician, the more profound. Such an argument explicitly forfeits the Greek passion for precision and systematic rigor, and, as always, Greece gets her revenge for the desertion, for the argument is patently self-defeating: if obscurity is the mark of profundity, then it is impossible to distinguish which of two equally obscure philosophies is the truer; and, to push this line of defense to its logical conclusion, a philosophy which manages to make even a modicum of sense is, by this standard, less profound than the babblings of an infant, which make none at all. (In tenacious fidelity to this chain of reasoning, Zen Buddhism has developed its *koan* in the deliberate effort to reduce the language of rational articulation to meaningless noises.)

The third expedient sometimes adopted by the philosopher in self-defense is the plea that if a particular philosophy meets with a favorable response, it therefore "speaks to the times" and is above reproach. As the Greeks would be the first to ask, however, supposing it does find a sympathetic reception among a particular group, precisely what is proved by that? The question of philosophic import remains: Is this particular school *right*? There are times when some philosophers seem almost ready to abandon the most elementary principle of both Athens and Jerusalem, to waive the question of truth altogether and simply assert that a philosophy is justified if it appeals to a majority. The Greeks were far wiser than this. The rival Stoic and Epicurean schools never appealed for vindication to their respective enrollments. For if the majority determined what is true, then philosophers would be reduced to taking a continual public opinion poll in order to keep abreast of day-to-day fluctuations in the truth market, and philosophy itself would become a popularity contest. And then, of course, the majority could always decide that the majority was wrong, thus delivering to philosophy its *coup de grace*.

Thus, instead of alleviating the philosopher's discomfiture, these three counter-arguments only compound it. As long as philosophy's formal

rules are erected into a false god (the real), every effort to escape his predicament will only tighten the noose. That the biblical conception of the real can fulfil these formal requirements will be urged in the following section.

III. THE BIBLICAL ALTERNATIVE

Turning from the foregoing critique of what Aldous Huxley calls the "perennial philosophy," the present discussion will now contrast it with the biblical conception of God (the real). While the god of the former is impassible, the God of the Bible loves; while the former, since it is beyond all distinctions, is beyond good and evil, the latter is the God of righteousness. The former is inclusive and general (Being-as-such); the latter is unique, distinct, particular (*a* Being). The former (though held to be absolutely unrelated!) is related to the world by a sort of unlucky accident which is, nevertheless a necessity of its nature; namely, the two-fold process by which "the many" differentiate out of "the one" and return to it again. This ambiguous process is "unfortunate" insofar as it disrupts unity, but "fortunate" insofar as it adds to the totality of Being. The God of the Bible, on the contrary, brings his creation into existence for a special purpose by a concrete act of will.

It is this single word, "will," as fundamental to biblical thought as it is distorted or omitted by most other philosophies, which best expresses the gulf between these two gods. Nothing is more characteristic of the Living God than purposive action. Yet the attitude of most philosophers toward this common sense conception is illustrated by Spinoza, who maintained that if a stone hurtling through the air were endowed with consciousness, it would imagine that it was free" (unless, he might have added, the stone's consciousness should rise to the intensity of the philosopher's, in such case it would realize that freedom is illusory). On the basis of the original dichotomy by which the philosopher separates reality into static, rational "Being," and dynamic, irrational "Non-Being," there is simply no room for freedom at all. What has happened historically is that freedom has been "reinterpreted" in terms of one or the other of these two categories, neither of which allows for free choice in any significant sense. Philosophers who, like Spinoza or Hegel, give priority to reason and knowledge (Being) have reduced freedom to the "recognition of necessity." Those who, like Bergson and Berdyaev, have inclined toward the vital and irrational (Non-Being) have reduced freedom to chaotic, undirected

¹¹Benedict Spinoza, Epistle 62.

spontaneity (Bergson was never able to wriggle out of the trammels of his own logic, which drove him to concede that animals were more "free" than men). Evidence that this latter trend has infiltrated theology itself occurs whenever the attempt is made to equate the living, personal God of the Bible with the "Dionysian" or "Scotistic" aspect of reality.

Lacking any foundation for real freedom in their metaphysic, philosophers (Bertrand Russell, to mention only one) have often explicitly tried to exclude it from philosophic discourse by branding the phrase "free will" as meaningless, or the "discussion about free will" as obsolete. How, in the name of philosophy, they can thus expose themselves to the charge of censorship is difficult to understand—until it is recalled that this very freedom constitutes their Achilles heel. Having begun with the division of reality into the rational and the irrational, this kind of philosophy can never hope to put Humpty-Dumpty together again from these two fragments. It could only avoid this embarrassment if it were to begin, as the Bible does, with the freedom of God and man. The philosophical cogency of this biblical position can be established in two different ways, the first more "existential," the second more strictly logical. The first runs as follows:

If man is free (and it is finally self-contradictory to suppose the contrary, as will be shown below), a definite conclusion follows concerning the kind of "god" who could really (and not just in name) be God for a human being. In order really to be God, he would have to enjoy at least the same freedom as man himself. As between a free being and one who is unfree, the former always exercises dominion over the latter. Consequently, when man in his freedom sets up something unfree and calls it "god," he can do so only on the basis of a deception. While paying lip service to such a "god," man himself actually pulls the strings. The Old Testament prophets, in their running battle with idolatry, constantly emphasize the self-deception upon which it depends, and which, when exposed, makes the idolater look foolish: "He (the idolater) feedeth on ashes. A deceived heart hath turned him aside, that he cannot deliver his soul, nor say, 'Is there not a lie in my right hand?'" (Isaiah 44:20). Though originally aimed against idols of wood and stone, this insight has a direct philosophical application. When philosophy maintains, for example, that God *cannot* have will or purpose, or that God *cannot* be a Being distinct from his creation ("a Being besides other beings"), just who is calling the tune for whom? Is the "god" of such pronouncements, however sophisticated, any less

pathetic than the gods of the Dahomean tribe in Africa, who must be kept alive by daily instructions from their *soi-disant* worshippers?¹²

According to the prophets, to let God be God means to allow him at least the same freedom that man has; that is, if the word "god" is to be properly used, it can refer only to a Free Agent. A philosophy which fails to meet this requirement is based upon a falsehood. The prophet could therefore apply to it the same confident prediction he makes about other forms of idolatry: the self-deception which it conceals will become the agent of its own destruction. And conversely, such a philosophy will never achieve coherence and truth until it incorporates an adequate conception of the real. The biblical concept of idolatry thus impinges directly upon metaphysics. Transcribed into philosophical terms, it makes explicit and central a principle to which Socrates alone adhered faithfully, and which even he never fully articulated: self-contradiction is the tribute which false presuppositions ultimately pay to true ones.

Biblical and unbiblical philosophies agree, then, that even though a primary presupposition cannot be established by proof, it can be tested indirectly by whether or not it entails consequences which are incompatible with one another. This contention that only the true *content* can satisfy philosophy's *formal* criterion of consistency is the basis of the second, more strictly logical argument in support of biblical metaphysics. This argument rests on the consideration that all human endeavor presupposes freedom, including the enterprise of philosophy itself. For the philosopher depends upon the distinction of true from false—that is, on the *freedom* to distinguish true from false. Take away freedom and you thereby preclude all thinking. For example, what is the difference between being told that there is a man under the bed by an insane person, and by a normal person? The idiot's statement has no claim to credibility because he is not free to make this distinction. The latter's, however, if made in good faith, claims my serious attention precisely because it is made with such freedom. Without freedom, then, no distinction of true and false is possible, and philosophy can never get started. Philosophy has therefore often been at cross purposes with itself. On the one hand, in dedicating itself to separate the true from the false, it has implicitly presupposed the freedom to do so. On the other hand, by reducing all reality to static-rational and dynamic-irrational, it is led explicitly to deny the very freedom upon which it depends. One could venture a safe prediction about the outcome of

¹²See Herbert Muller, *The Uses of the Past* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1952) pp. 55, 340.

such an undertaking: the attempt to exclude freedom while tacitly presupposing it, would eventually issue in self-contradictions. By drawing attention to some of these, the foregoing pages have sought to illustrate the principle that false premises lead inevitably to mutually contradictory conclusions.

In order to avoid these difficulties, it would be necessary to acknowledge that the real cannot exclude freedom, but must include it. The word "freedom", however, refers directly to no reality at all, but is merely a term of convenience derived from the fact of free *agents*. Contrary to what philosophy has so often maintained, therefore, that the real is the rational, that reason-in-general (*logos*) is the presupposition of all that is, it would appear that the Bible is philosophically more correct in holding that the reasoning process itself presupposes the free agent, without whom it could not exist at all. To the question, "What is the real?" the answer could therefore no longer be given in terms of *logos* or Being (or Non-Being, either), but the presupposition of all reasoning whatsoever: the free agent. The question about ultimate reality would then have to be re-phrased. Instead of "what is ultimately real?" the proper question would then be, "*Who* is ultimately real?" As long as philosophy continues to ask the first question, it can be expected to fall into contradictions in its quest for an answer.

So much for a brief exposition of the arguments in favor of the biblical conception of the real. In view of the correlation already noted between the real and the true, it remains to examine the implications of this position for the biblical view of truth. Truth could no longer be primarily conceived in terms either of *data about* something (Thomism) or of some imagined "identity of subject and object" which cannot be put into words (mysticism). Rather, it would refer to Someone and to the direction and purposes of His elective will. This would mean that if there were to be the possibility of truth at all (an open question thus far), it would depend on there being Someone who could say without deception, "I am the truth." And if there were to be the further possibility of *knowing* this truth, it would partly depend, as always in the case of knowing (*connaître, kennen*) another person, upon his voluntary initiative (revelation) and man's response to it (faith).

The consequences of such a position are radically at variance with the inveterate predilection of most philosophy, which has tended to eschew all knowledge which could not be derived from within oneself alone. Anything which comes from without seems to it to bear the stamp of contingency and must be rejected in favor of demonstration

a priori. Plato's doctrine of recollection is perhaps the most familiar illustration. In the same spirit, as the starting point for his philosophy, Descartes chose to be "shut up in a stove," cut off from all external influences. Spinoza's attempt to make philosophy a deductive science "in the manner of geometry" corroborates Bertrand Russell's epigram, "The influence of mathematics on philosophy has been profound and unfortunate." A classic example of this tendency is Fichte's statement of the philosopher's ideal:

The philosopher must deduce from his adopted principles all possible phenomena of experience. . . . In the fulfilment of this purpose, he does not require the aid of experience; he proceeds purely as a philosopher (*sic!*), paying no respect whatever to experience; rather, he describes time as a whole in all its possible epochs, absolutely *a priori*.¹²

By contrast, a biblical metaphysic would hold that all that the philosopher can accomplish *in vacuo* is to discover unmistakably that he is indeed *in vacuo*. The answer to his quest would require a word from beyond himself, rather than the hypostatization of the vacuum itself.

To persons already under the influence of this "perennial metaphysic," the suggestion that knowledge of the truth cannot be derived from contemplation of the principles of reason and logic, but depends instead upon the philosopher's relation to Him who is the Truth, will appear to signal the end of philosophy. All it really marks, however, is the end of a certain *kind* of philosophy, a kind which the most recent developments in logical analysis, however unproductive they have so far been in themselves, have justifiably described as tautologous. The end of this kind of speculation would simply mean the realization by philosophers that when reason makes itself its own god, all it can do thereafter is to pull rabbits out of the hat which it has itself put there in the first place.

Perhaps on the theory that the best defense consists in counterattack, this "perennial philosophy" sometimes makes the charge that the entire biblical metaphysic is simply anthropomorphism. To pin a label on an argument, however, hardly serves to refute it. The question remains whether or not this "anthropomorphism" is philosophically legitimate. In an attempt to consider this question on its merits, the first point is that if one is to speak at all, one cannot avoid a "morph-

¹²Quoted by F. M. Cornford in *The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950) p. 31.

ism" of some kind, and the only choice would seem to be between anthropomorphism and "sub-anthropomorphism." The most obvious kind of sub-anthropomorphism, the worship of idols of wood and stone, was the target of the prophets' ridicule. Less obvious and more sophisticated is the idol created simply in the image of the principles of logic. Should one care to engage in the byplay of coining labels, one could call this "logicomorphism." The real issue would then simply be: which of the two better satisfies the canons of philosophy, anthropomorphism or logicomorphism?—the very inquiry undertaken by the present article.

In reply, it is sometimes maintained that there is a third alternative, that the real is neither the personal nor sub-personal, but "more than personal." "The personal element is included in Being."⁴ The issue is simply this: either, as biblical metaphysics maintains, the unique freedom of the person defies subsumption under *any* category, or, on the contrary, his apparently qualitative uniqueness can be reduced to merely quantitative terms, and thus incorporated under some more inclusive heading. As a test of these two positions, the following experiment can be applied. Suppose that there were in fact no higher category than the self, that the free agent is not simply high up on the mountain slope, but stands on the pinnacle. In that case, any attempt to go beyond the personal to some imagined "supra-personal" level would instead only plunge headlong down the other side. Whether this has in fact occurred can be determined by a perfectly simple question: Is the philosophy which cleaves reality into the dichotomy of rational and irrational, static and dynamic, able to distinguish between the so-called "supra-personal" and the merely sub-personal? This distinction it does not care to state. Its reluctance to do so invites the suspicion that it merely offers the same package under two different labels. *Caveat emptor*. The Bible's insistence that no category is higher than the free agent again gives it the metaphysical advantage.

To press the argument one step further, the gods of Being and Non-Being themselves turn out to be "anthropomorphic," in the sense that they are simply projections of that fictitious monstrosity, the philosopher's man. For all that remains of the free agent after he has been through the logical meat-grinder is "rational animal"—a compound of rationality (Being), on the one hand, and chaotic vitality (Non-Being), on the other—the very stuff of which philosophy's gods are so often made. Thus even the charge of anthropomorphism is one which back-

⁴This is the position taken by Paul Tillich in "The Idea of the Personal God", *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, November, 1940.

fires. Perhaps anthropomorphism would be less obnoxious to this kind of philosophy if it had a more adequate conception of *anthropos*.

It remains to be noted that some theologians react to the mere mention of the word "anthropomorphism" as though to a loud "Boo!", owing to their understandable anxiety to avoid the conception of God which has unfortunately found its way into a good deal of Christian piety—a sort of heavenly Santa Claus who promises pie-in-the-sky, or who fondly endorses and even assists the private aspirations of the individual. The trouble with such a god, however, is not that it is anthropomorphic. The trouble is rather that it is *not* anthropomorphic. Far from being analogous to a real, flesh-and-blood man, it is made in the image merely of the *wishes* of particular men. In order to be truly anthropomorphic, it would have to become free. A God who is free, however, is the only kind of God whom man could not create, whose *will* man would have to wait upon, instead of secretly pulling his puppet strings from behind the scenes. Such a God spells the doom of all wishful deification of one's own pet projects, for such a God can alone say "no" to the indiscriminate or unprincipled ambitions of men, as he so emphatically does in the Bible.

IV. CONCLUSION

Suppose that the foregoing suggestions, with their supporting arguments, should in some form survive the test of philosophical criticism, and that truth and reality were conceived in terms of Him who is the Truth. What then? What would be the implications for theology and philosophy? Philosophy as a deductive science would be dedicated in part to proving that the answers to the fundamental questions as to the nature of God, the nature of man, and human destiny (questions to which not even logical positivism can avoid implying answers) could not in principle be derived *a priori*. Instead, they would be "contingent" upon "knowledge by acquaintance" with this Someone, and upon right relationship with Him. The role of reason in the goodness of creation would thus consist partly in re-phrasing many of philosophy's traditional questions in such a way as to demonstrate its own futility apart from revelation. By anticipating the personal form that revelation would have to take, it could enable men more readily to recognize God when they encounter Him. The process of logical demonstration thus comes to an end, not with a climactic and certain proposition about the cosmos, but with a burning question: *Who* is He? Has He in fact revealed Himself? On the basis of reason itself, the philosopher can thus

be led to the living water. Precisely because this water is the "truth which makes free," however, neither logic nor any other human device can coerce him to drink. What theology can do is to show him that if one does drink, then and only then do philosophy's deepest questions find an answer.

The questions answered by Christianity, however, are not primarily of interest for the sake of an intellectual jig-saw puzzle. Indeed, if there is any single point at which a biblical metaphysic enjoys an initial advantage, it is the fact that the issues with which it deals all spring directly out of the common stuff of everyday experience, the use and abuse of freedom. Unable as they are to include freedom in their systems, academic philosophies, by contrast, have frequently decried the common sense views of "the many" as "upside down," or "backwards." From Plato to Heidegger, they have likened ordinary living to cave-dwelling, and scorned the cares and concerns of the average man (*das Man*) as "unauthentic" (*uneigentlich*). Biblical categories are "unique" and "distinctive," not as compared to the "naive" language of ordinary men, but in contrast to the esoteric tendencies of most other philosophies. If freedom were established at the center of metaphysics, then the key words at the heart of biblical thinking, words as close to everyday living as they are foreign to most metaphysics, would become decisive for philosophy itself. Sin, repentance, forgiveness, love, gratitude, righteousness, covenant, choice, all meaningless outside a context of free agents, would take precedence over Being, Non-Being, *logos*, and most of the rest of a highly technical vocabulary. It would be the task of biblical metaphysics to develop its "structures"—to answer the age-old philosophical questions concerning the meaning of life—in terms of these words and of the actions of free agents to which they refer. In this way it can confirm the conviction of many theologians that the truest philosophy will also be the most relevant. For the biblical categories are "distinctive" precisely because they are able to speak at *all* times to *all* men, provided only that they are willing to listen.

If such a project can be successfully carried out, then there will be a new aspect to the answer implied by Tertullian's rhetorical question, "What has Jerusalem to do with Athens?" Basically, the answer will be the same as always: Jerusalem has everything to do with Athens. She has to save Athens from herself. First and foremost, she has to save *men*. One aspect of this primary task, however, inevitably involves the *minds* of men. Can Jerusalem challenge Athens in her own bailiwick, the realm of thinking? However unlikely the prospect might seem

at first glance, the preceding pages have found some encouragement for the hope not only that biblical metaphysics need not take a back seat for academic philosophy, but that the sons of Athens herself may find that all roads are blind alleys except the one that leads to Jerusalem.

Need it come as a surprise to the Christian if this should indeed turn out to be the case? For every philosophy has its *theos*, its ultimate presupposition as to the nature of the real. Just as the gods of the Canaanites eventually proved impotent before the Living God, so also might we not suspect that in the realm of philosophy, too, the incorporation of a well-intended but mistaken idea of God would bring about the eventual downfall of such a philosophy in a mass of contradictions? Tertullian was surely right in holding with St. Paul that the biblical conception of God was "foolishness to the Greeks." But if this God really is the Lord of *all* creation, then it should be possible to show, in terms of the standards which philosophy itself acknowledges, that in its metaphysical application this very "foolishness of God" really is "wiser than men"—that even in the realm of metaphysical inquiry God hath not left himself without witness.

THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND PROFESSOR CASSERLEY

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In his book, *The Christian in Philosophy*, Professor Casserley states that it is his purpose "to show that there is such a thing as a specifically and recognizably Christian form of philosophy, or way of philosophizing, and to indicate what method it must adopt in facing up to its problems."¹ Such an aim, and the book itself in its post-publication effect, have been both stimulating and beneficial.

Of central importance to the position which Professor Casserley develops is his treatment of the ontological and cosmological arguments for the existence of God. It is this facet of his argument that we wish to examine, and we may, perhaps, most profitably proceed by first offering a general statement of Professor Casserley's position on the matter.

¹J. V. Langmead Casserley, *The Christian in Philosophy* (London: Faber, 1949), p. 15.

In the view with which he is sympathetic, "Christian theism is primarily a metaphysic of self-consciousness, rather than a metaphysic of nature. . . ."² Professor Casserley regards this conviction as the primary contribution of the Augustinian tradition to Christian thought.

The being which is apprehended from without can only be known, if at all, by analogy with the being which we really know from within, our own. For human beings at all events the only possible approach to the problems of metaphysics must lie through a careful analysis of all that is involved in being human. Hence the Augustinian metaphysic, by beginning with self-consciousness, at least chooses the right approach. By contrast, there is something almost perverse in the Aristotelian and Thomistic procedure, which relies primarily upon the argument from the being of a relatively unknown nature, however vividly apprehended, to the being of a relatively unknown God, however profoundly experienced.³

The first caution to observe after reading these words is not to let the proper names mentioned influence us either pro or con about the question at stake. A systematic problem is at issue here, and its solution can stand or fall independently of any or all historical figures to which reference has been made. What we must do is to see how Professor Casserley works out his chosen position.

At first glance it appears that his position is being uncompromisingly maintained when he states that "our consciousness of other beings and things only reveals to us what it *looks like* to be, self-consciousness reveals what it *really is* to be."⁴ (Italics mine.) The implication seems to be that the former consciousness is illusory and misleading, while the latter alone is true and trustworthy. We are explicitly told, however, that that is not the case.

For the Augustinians our consciousness of the external world is trustworthy enough. . . . Self-consciousness is . . . not necessarily more reliable than, still less prior to, our consciousness of the external world. . . . Indeed the self remains unknown even to itself except by contrast with the not self. The self is always known in our experience as finite, limited, dependent, constricted by frontiers, not alone in the world. . . . Martin Heidegger insists that what is initially given to us in self-consciousness is not a detached pure self but being-in-the-world. I believe that this is true of all levels of self-consciousness.⁵

²*ibid.*, p. 45.

³*ibid.*, p. 56.

⁴*ibid.*, p. 98.

⁵*ibid.*, p. 97.

It is acknowledged, then, that consciousness of the external world is as valid and trustworthy as consciousness of the self. Both can furnish us with truth. Just as important, we have *not* been shown that in the internal awareness of being we are able to discover anything by *rational analysis* that is *different* from the nature of being as it is externally observed. A difference between our intuitive, internal awareness of being and its external observaton has been validly referred to, but so far it has not been shown that our awareness of external being is in any way *rationally* inadequate to get an intellectual recognition of God. If it is objected that the "God of religious experience" is so much more than this "cold" intellectual recognition, we do not deny it, but we do deny that that is the point at issue here.

If Professor Casserley really believes, as he says, that self-consciousness is always that of a being-in-the-world, then it would appear that Christian theism cannot be "a metaphysic of self-consciousness" without being at the same time and primarily "a metaphysic of nature." The one metaphysic does not seem to be opposed to the other in quite the manner which Professor Casserley's argument indicates.

In fact, upon critical examination, it does not appear to us that the difference exists between the cosmological and ontological argument (as Casserley interprets the latter) which it is his purpose to maintain. It is said that "the ontological argument contends that we all, if we probe the depths of our own minds and understand the inner workings of our own thoughts, believe in such a being as God already, and cannot, so long as we remain rational, cease to do so."¹ Advocates of the cosmological argument have no quarrel whatever with these words. The important thing to notice in this quotation is that it is to the understanding and rational nature of man that Professor Casserley appeals. Our point is that it is only the type of thought which the cosmological argument employs which can provide *a satisfactory way for man to probe the depths of his consciousness and indicate what it is of which that depth consists.*

The source of possible confusion now becomes manifest. Although reference is made to the ontological *argument*, it is not the argumentative, rational aspect of man that Casserley is referring to here. He is referring rather to an *experience* of man. To be sure this experience has rational elements in it, but its additional non-rational elements are enough to cause misunderstanding when the experience is repeatedly called by its intellective aspect alone. In the quotation to which we

¹*Ibid.*, p. 84.

have just referred it appeared that our concern was to be only with the understanding and its concepts. That this is not the intention of the author, however, can be seen from his criticism of Anselm and Descartes. He says that for Anselm "the idea of God is not an idea at all, in St. Thomas's conceptual sense, but a vivid apprehension."⁷ Similarly, Descartes was wrong in thinking that he was dealing with clear and distinct *ideas*; what he was really dealing with was "a profound experience."⁸

There is nothing wrong with experience; all of the points of view with which we are dealing agree that we must have it, and that all fruitful beginnings will be made in it. But if the term "experience" is going to be used in such a way as to include "intellectual operations" (as Professor Casserley says that he does use it), must not specifically *intellectual* criteria, among others, be satisfied? If so, we seem to be at a decided disadvantage if we won't let an idea—whether it be employed in a true or false manner—be an idea. An idea is not "a vivid apprehension," but if the vivid apprehension is had by a human being, ideas—in the strict sense—are involved in the experience and will result from it. If ideas are intrinsically involved in it, ideas and intellectual operations must contribute something *significant* to the total apprehension or experience. We are not helping ourselves if we only point to intellectual deficiencies. Nor is there anything wrong in considering the intellectual aspect of experience alone and by itself, and especially so when we refer to the experience by such terms as "logic" and "knowledge," as Professor Casserley does.

We must carefully consider all the aspects of the view which Professor Casserley advocates. He approves of the position of Anselm.

If we retire sufficiently into the depths of ourselves, . . . such is the final testimony of Anselm, we find ourselves face to face with the fact of Absolute Being and we find that Absolute Being is God.⁹

This introspective process is not as simple as the statement might lead us to believe. We can retire into ourselves in two senses, in a psychological and in a metaphysical sense. Psychologically, if we introspect long and hard enough, we will bump into what is, *for us*, an ultimate experience. But there seems to be an inference involved, if on the basis

⁷*ibid.*, p. 63.

⁸*ibid.*, p. 96.

⁹*ibid.*, p. 59, n. 2.

¹⁰*ibid.*, p. 63.

of this "ultimate" psychological experience alone, we say that it is an experience of God. A different rational ground is required for the latter statement. It may be that the psychological experience is ultimate for us only because of our limited psychological makeup. A *metaphysical insight into the nature of our being* is the only proper basis for associating this experience with God. It may be replied, "Yes, but 'self-consciousness is creature-consciousness.'" As soon as this creature-consciousness is recognized, however, we maintain that the metaphysic of nature and the cosmological argument are present, for the concept "creature" is meaningless apart from the concept of "causation." Causation is a metaphysical concept, and the principle of causation is the essence of the cosmological argument.

Let us again observe Casserley's emphasis on self-consciousness.

We approach the philosophical problems of Absolute Being not entirely empty-handed and unequipped because, being ourselves existing individuals, we already know within ourselves what it is to be. St. Thomas does not use language of this kind because what we have called the existentialist element in the Augustinian teaching was precisely the element upon which it was essential for him, in the crisis with which he was concerned, to turn his back. Hence his preference for the causal language and scheme of things. . . ."

We must again bear in mind that when the term "know" is used in this quotation its intended significance is apparently that of "experience," not rational knowledge in the strict sense. No new *rational* or intellectually communicable insight into the nature of being has been shown to be given in our consciousness of ourselves as over against that of external things; in the former case we merely have a certain "feeling" added to the rational elements. It is to the second half of the quotation that we must now more carefully turn our attention.

The thought suggested is that Aquinas spoke in the causal language that he did because he had turned his back on the existential emphasis of Augustine. This, in a most profound sense, is simply not the case. Aquinas spoke in a causal manner precisely because existence was his primary concern. The causal relation is involved in the most intimate knowledge of ourselves of which Augustine speaks. At the finite level, there can be no real separation of existence from causation. It is only right to admit that Aquinas did not *stress* the existence of which we are aware in self-consciousness as over against the existence of external

¹¹*ibid.*, p. 53.

objects. The presentation of Aquinas would no doubt have been more convincing and complete if he had included a phenomenological description of the basic datum of being as we find it in the awareness of ourselves. There is a sense, however, in which he did not have to give such an analysis, for every aspect of the being of which we are aware in ourselves, which is accessible to rational analysis, was mentioned and accommodated by him in his more general treatment of the nature of being. This is no more than would be expected of a person who thought of metaphysics as the study of being *qua* being. *All* of the rational aspects of being are dealt with and considered in such a science—even those of self-consciousness. By Professor Casserley's own admission that our awareness of external being is not unreliable, there can be no justification for reserving the adjective "existential" for only the "Augustinian tradition" in its introspective moments.

There can be no doubt that Professor Casserley's conceptions of the nature of causation and the basis for its justification in use have much to do with his evaluation of the cosmological argument. Certainly the cosmological argument must go if it is true, as he says, that "we now know that it is possible to think intelligibly about nature without employing the concept of causality in any form whatever."¹² It will appear to many that Professor Casserley is here guilty of the apologetic error of conceding too much to his contemporaries. "Recent intellectual experiments" are mentioned as justification for this assertion, but no specific ones are listed. We, on the other hand, suggest that the intelligibility of nature is impossible without the causal concept. *Metaphysically* it is *impossible*, for example, to dispense with efficient causation, for only this can account for the existence of a finite thing. It cannot be denied that mathematical physics, to take an example, *for its purposes*, can dispense *within its formal bounds* with this idea of efficient causation. But even so doing, it does not appear to get along without "the concept of causality in any form whatever," for its investigations seem still to concern what the Aristotelians called formal causality.¹³

If the acceptance of the principle of causation is arbitrary, then the cosmological argument must go—but then so must the necessity of conceiving ourselves as creatures when we consider our relation to God. Professor Casserley at least seems to approach this position when he writes: "Whether, indeed, we are justified in accepting this assumption that the effect will somehow resemble the cause has been and may well

¹²*ibid.*, p. 216.

¹³Cf. Fernand Rencirte, *Cosmology* (New York: Wagner, 1950).

be doubted. It is at least conceivable that a Creator might create a universe which contained no vestige of resemblance to his own Being."¹⁴ The shortcomings attributed to causation here are due to its being considered a mere assumption. If that is all it is, naturally we can get along without it, if we will just assume something else.

The alternatives to accepting the principle of causation, when the problem is most basically considered, is to violate either the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason or to revert to some arational vegetative state. These being the consequences of not accepting the principle of causation, it is *not* conceivable that God could act in the manner suggested. That there could be a creation which possessed *no* resemblance to its cause is a metaphysical impossibility. To perform such a feat God would have to be involved in a contradictory situation. *He*, the only agent who can create, would have to create something which "looked" as if it was not created by Him in any respect; He would have to leave no trace of Himself in creation. In other words, God would have to create something positive which "looked" as if it had a source external to him, when in the nature of the case and by definition nothing positive can have a source external to Him. Ultimately there is nothing outside of God for the being of a thing to resemble. Of course it is possible that God could create a universe in which there were no creatures who could *recognize* a resemblance to the Creator, but that is another matter. It must also be remembered that the resemblance of an effect to its cause which we are here considering is a *metaphysical* resemblance only; there may easily be—and in *this* universe is—no picturable or imaginable resemblance between the two.

All that we have said is not to deny that the cosmological argument as a "proof" may very well have different characteristics from proofs as they are ordinarily and discursively conceived. In fact, it has been suggested that the cosmological argument is more in the nature of a *completion of finite being* than of an inference to a completely new and unknown being. As soon as finite being is truly recognized in its finitude, i.e. as soon as the real nature of finite being is grasped, there is an immediate realization that its existence involves the existence of God. Now this realization of which we speak may be in the nature of an intuition; it may occur in a flash. As soon as we really know ourselves, we know ourselves as depending on God. But this self-knowledge is *creature-knowledge* and so at least implicitly involves the concept of causation. What we are attempting to suggest is that, even if

¹⁴Casserey, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

we really know ourselves and God simultaneously, this simultaneous insight has a *rational structure* because of its causal nature. The statement of this rational structure is called the cosmological argument. If, in virtue of the characteristics we have just mentioned, a person does not wish to call the cosmological argument a proof, no vital point has been lost. The important thing is that we understand the situation, not what term we call it by.

We may say in conclusion that it is our belief that Professor Casserley's book opens discussion on matters which are vital for the proper understanding of the Christian religion in the world today. The present essay is itself evidence that the book is provocative. It has been our concern to offer some alternative suggestions to certain critical interpretations made by Professor Casserley.

We have seen that Professor Casserley's advocacy of the ontological argument as over against the cosmological one is based upon the contention that "Christian theism is primarily a metaphysic of self-consciousness, rather than a metaphysic of nature. . . ." Here it was our suggestion that these two metaphysics cannot be separated; each necessarily involves the other. The metaphysics of nature includes consideration of the self as a mode of finite being, and so it would seem that the cosmological argument accommodates as one of its species the ontological argument, as Professor Casserley has interpreted it—and insofar as the argument is considered at the level of intellection. If in properly realizing ourselves we realize ourselves as creatures, then we realize ourselves as *caused* by God. As soon as the causal concept enters the picture, we have present the structure and essential elements of the cosmological argument. It should be remembered that the cosmological argument can start with an examination and appreciation of the self as well as with any other finite being; indeed, there may be certain advantages to so starting it, as Professor Casserley points out. Keeping our discussion of the various *arguments* at the level of knowledge as it is technically accepted, we have neither found nor been shown that any *rationally different* analysis of being is furnished by an "Augustinian," internal awareness of our own being than is furnished by our observations of external being. It is admitted that both observations can furnish us with truth and that neither is prior to the other; the internal awareness of being merely couches the truth which it presents in an additional "feeling" which the observation of external being lacks. We do not see that the presence of such "feeling" is a legitimate consideration in a rational argument, although we certainly recognize it as a valid and ever present aspect of *experience*, when the latter is taken generically.

IMPERSONAL PERSONS

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I used to think, carelessly, that Buddhism is wonderful because it demands the dissolution, the annihilation of finite persons in the infinite swim of Nirvana. And I was vexed by the pluralistic personalism of Howison and Bowne. All this, because I believed that being impersonal was a cardinal virtue, and that this entailed the cessation of being a person. The analogy, in my picturesque thinking about the issue, was with circles and circularity. If there is something wrong with circularity and it is to be abolished, then of course circles must go with it. The taint of the property infects the essence in this case.

I was looking on the relation of impersonality to persons as if it were analogous to that of non-circularity to circles. But clearly this is a mistake.

It began to dawn on me that being impersonal, far from involving the annihilation of persons, is a condition or characteristic which only they are capable of realizing. A cabbage, a stone, is not impersonal. It is inanimate. The fine impersonality I have noted and loved so much belongs to the best *persons*. Hence being personal simply cannot belong to persons as circularity belongs to circles, since, if it did, no person could survive being impersonal.

The correct analogy is with, say, balls and rolling. The function of a ball is not to be wholly stationary or at rest, though it can exist in that state. As Aristotle might say, it is not "really" a ball except as actualizing itself in and through the rolling function. Or at least it is "better" (*eudaimonia*) when acting this way. And, strictly, to be able either to roll or be at rest in this way, is the capacity of a ball. It doesn't cease being a ball when it rolls. Rather, it fulfills its nature in that function.

Well, this is more like the impersonal person case. A person is analogous to a ball, and being impersonal means behaving or functioning in a certain way. It *takes* persons for there to be anything like impersonality. (The dependence does not hold in reverse: there can be persons without impersonality.) The Buddhists, and mystics generally, are therefore quite wrong in arguing the desirability of the annihilation

of persons, at least in so far as their reason is the bad one, that being impersonal involves ceasing to be a person.

There is another, much better argument for their pessimistic rejection of individual persons, in favor of something larger than any person. I believe it was this argument which, all the time, underlay the other spurious one, generating in me vexation toward anything that is a person. But, before examining this better argument, I want to find out what being impersonal is, as a kind of behavior or function fulfilling a person, as rolling consummates a ball.

Several factors exhibit themselves. An impersonal person will not allude, either directly or by innuendo, to the foibles or fortes of persons when the issue is an idea. His own person, as those of his associates, are out of the picture. Themes and things get impartial consideration, as the common objects of communal experience. In such a treatment and attitude, whether or not the person has to yield to a better formulation of the subject than his own previous one, will not affect his ego. In fact, it is precisely "ego," not "person," which must come under restrictions, sometimes to the vanishing point, in favor of the truth communally conceived. The method of being impersonal in this way gets its all-time classic exhibition in the manner of Socrates, who begged his friends to let him assist at the birth of ideas, not the buttering or belittling of persons. This is a fine way to be impersonal and, relative to common conversation, is perhaps what most people have in mind when they think of and talk about impersonality.

Another has more to do, not with oral exchange, but conduct generally. In this sense, an impersonal person is exclusively neither self-seeking nor self-depriving, in the goals he holds up for attainment. The simple numerical difference between persons, such as the fact that Tom is not Dick, is not by itself allowed to influence the judgment of the impersonal person, when he decides on how to treat them. His own person gets the same impartial view. Nothing is seen as better simply because it is *his* good. This would be to violate the maxim of impersonal consideration of persons. Of course, he will often do for Dick what he refuses to do for Tom (he may himself be Dick), but always with a view to circumstances justifying, in fact demanding, the different treatment. Dick may be in need of extraordinarily tactful advice or of money, unlike Tom. But this is more than the fact simply that Dick is not Tom.

Being impersonal will sometimes appear also in forms of aesthetic expression. Instead of propagandizing in favor of a political or social

cause, at the expense of the luminous self-sufficiency of an impartial work of art, the latter will present a theme or thing as objective spectacle, primarily for the sake of the vision—seeing something more clearly in the art medium than in the raw state of nature. To be able to manipulate media in this way presupposes impersonality. It is a sad and too current mistake to suppose that the artist is a genius at being personal, or at foisting his own little subjective and private experiences on people. Only people who don't know how to be impersonal in a systematic, successful way carry on with such exhibitions of their ego and its subjective contents, and these people are not artists.

Thus does being impersonal, as a kind of conduct and condition of persons, have many facets, in various activities. Let me now face up with my final question: what is the *good* argument, if any, for the supposition that the being of persons, as such, entails certain liabilities; in view of which, the monistic mystics seem to be right: persons must be dissolved away into the non-personal reality, for the sake of final perfection.

I think the respectable argument revolves around a fact of human nature, particularized in persons. There is something distinctive and uncomfortably complex about being a real person. Your dog is not a person, though it may have individuality or character or intelligence of a sort. *A fortiori*, no cabbage is a person. And so on down the scale into the clear-cut cases of inanimation. Viewed in the framework of the picture of evolution, persons are a special class of latecomers, whose very consciousness has a tragic cast.

What is it that defines the difference between a person and a sub-person, as the ear-mark of the person? The great religious and philosophical seers have noticed him as at least the potential (often the actual) center of conflict between vitality and spirituality. This pair of mighty opposites is also called the natural and the supernatural. The temptation is to call them Darkness and Light also, with the illumination being spiritual. But the trouble with this last way of putting it is that the vitality of the person as natural man is in its own way an excellent light, the celebrated *lumen naturale*, beside which the spiritual looks like what Milton called the "dim, religious light." In short, the polar opposition is between two goods each of which is infinite in its own right. The common tendency of the hypersensitive religious devotee to distrust and decry the natural light as really a deceptive darkness, in favor of *lumen gratiae*, is an easy but not adequate solution of the tension. In the arena of his own person, the human being goes on ex-

perienicing the conflict between the vital and the spiritual as tragic, because both are good and victory on either side will involve a genuine loss. If being spiritual gains the ascendancy, there is some of the being sicklied over with the pale cast of renunciation of life (*vita*). And when vitality encroaches, spirit recedes into the offing of pallid goals too remote to have must disturbing influence on the robust man of vital action. Thus is the buoyancy of the one the condition of the sinking of the other.

From the early Greek cosmologists, through Plato and Augustine, on down the line, this has been the theme, with variations, of the tragic predicament of anyone who is a real person. There is no rounded or global harmony of all goods possible for such. His nature is to be thus torn apart, as a citizen of two warring realms. The universal sympathy which the figure of Hamlet elicits, though so little understood, is caused by the spectacle, in his person, of the clash of an ancient order and its symbols of a high romance on the one hand, with the new scientific naturalism just emerging on the other. *Mutatis mutandis*, his case and predicament are symptomatic of being a real person. The larger the person, the wider the arena of conflict, and the mightier the clashing opposites, whose resonance is the tragic sense.

Now, it is not surprising that the vision of this condition generates pessimistic metaphysics and a religious mood of rejection of persons as such. In this view, suffering is of the personal essence, and salvation looks largely like an affair of exemption from being a person. Even the Deity had, as *Person*, to suffer in Christ. Theology is divided on how an adequate conception of God is to read. There are weighty reasons for holding that God, as perfect, cannot be a person. At the zenith of divine perfection is supra-personal Godhead. This, as such, does *not* suffer, or do, or become, out of concern. The symphony of religious mysticism, the world over, amplifies this theme. Possessed, or haunted, with such a vision, the disturbed human person hears the cosmic injunction "Rest, rest, perturbed spirit," and realizes that the only way to obey is to lay the ghost of his *person*. He must immolate it on the altar of something higher than any person, according to the mystic vision. . . .

Though this argument for the final sacrifice of persons is better than the first one that turned on the misconstrued meaning of the word "impersonal," and though it sets up deep resonances in the caverns of my mystical nature, yet it is by no means the last word. In fact, it is a fragmentary truth which, if held too exclusively as the whole truth,

becomes a common falsehood. Those who cling to this error may be getting consolation, or an anaesthetic for their wounds as persons, but they do not have the stature and stamina to grasp the whole fact.

The conception of God *simply* as transcendent godhead is as inadequate as the parallel mystical notion of man as *essentially* a universal, super-personal somewhat—a nothing in particular. The whole truth is given, rather, in a more complex doctrine. God *is* Person, and this means his nature is triune. The divine Person does suffer with man, in Christ, and knows infinite concern and compassion as the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, all without imperfection. Thus to achieve beatitude is not, for the human person, to plunge into, and lose his identity in, a non-personal Infinite, but to be Christ-like—or to be as perfect as he may while he suffers as a person. This is self-realization for any person, the seeming paradox of saving one's person by being impersonal, even sympathetic, toward the necessary suffering.

The peace that passes understanding does not by-pass the tragic circumstance of being a person. It roots and flowers in such crisis. The human person perpetually suffers and is perpetually saved. So does the Divine Person, in the person of Christ. The difference is that, in the human case, the person is perpetually saved from perpetual suffering *and imperfection*.

This larger, and in a way darker, conception of what being a real person involves, is coming again into its own. It is fundamentally orthodox and this is its strength. It has no countenance for the pat, unilateral notions of a person as capable of shuffling off suffering like a mortal coil and living happily ever after. Beneath Paradise is Purgatory, and under that is Hell; being a real person comprehends all three. In this respect, the human person also has a three-fold nature, and suffers. The demonic and the dark are in his system, as well as just his vital nature demanding its own excellent sort of light. And in the third place, he is spiritual, so, like Eliot's saintly Celia, tends occasionally to make a life-jolting exit from this world, in favor of the next.

Such solution of the tragic multiple tension of being a person as is available to a human being is in Christ, as paradigm. In Him the cosmic themes and mighty opposites of Life and Death, Heaven and Hell, Light and the Shadow, fuse and are transfigured. When the human person suffers and cries out: "Behold, and see if there be any sorrow like unto my sorrow which is done unto me, wherewith the Lord hath afflicted me," the crucial vision of Christ is the answer. In Christ, God is Person, and suffers too, without blemish. And such suffering infinitely transcends any human condition, being unprovoked. Salvation lies in this vision.

"ONLY-BEGOTTEN"—A FOOTNOTE TO THE NEW REVISION

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Since the new Revised Standard Version of the Bible appeared (the New Testament Feb. 11, 1946, the Old Testament Sept. 13, 1952) it has been widely acclaimed and welcomed. It has indeed been officially approved by the Episcopal Church as well as by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in America. In response to the special request of the Episcopal Church, the Revision Committee is now at work on the Apocrypha, which will be added to the R.S.V. as soon as it is ready. However, there are a few persons who are troubled by some of the new renderings, chiefly perhaps by the substitution of "only Son" for "only-begotten," in the old familiar passages, especially in the Gospel of St. John (e.g. 1:14, 18). The Greek word so translated, *monogenês*, is an old one with an interesting history. Hesiod uses it, in a passage in his *Works and Days* (376) where he is telling how to get rich: "There should be only one son, to increase wealth" (a dictum many families seem to have taken to heart). He also uses the word in *Theogony* 426, 448: "she is an only child." Herodotus uses it in VII. 221, where Megistias sends his only son home from the army at Thermopylae. To over-translate here, and render "only-begotten son", would destroy the pathos of that passage, and blur the impression of the father's concern for his son as the gallant band of Leonidas's men faced the impossible, hopeless odds, and prepared to sell their lives as dearly as possible—as all the world knows from the sublime epitaph that records their death. Plato uses the word in *Critias* 113 d: "an only daughter, Cleito"—who would think of calling her an "only-begotten" daughter! And Aeschylus, in *Agamemnon* 898, portrays Clytemnestra's glozing self-defense, when she says of her husband, "He is like an only son [and therefore beloved] of his father."

In the Bible we find it in the Septuagint, e.g. in Judges 11:34, where the Hebrew reads as in the R.S.V. (Jephthah's only daughter). Also in Tobit 3:15, where again it is an only daughter; and 8:17, an only son and only daughter. In Hebrews 11:17, Isaac is Abraham's only son. In Luke 7:12 the widow's son at Nain is an only son—how little em-

phasis Greek usage laid on the second part of the word *monogenês* is obvious from Luke's addition, "she was a widow" (women do not beget children in Greek any more than in good English; they bear them). In Luke 9:38 the demoniac boy is an only son: in both these cases the Vulgate, that "queen of the versions", reads *unicus*, not *unigenitus*. In 8:48 Jairus's daughter is an only child (*unica*). But in John 1:14, 3:16-18, I John 4:9, the Vulgate has *Unigenitus*, perhaps because of the Christological implications the verses were thought to bear if so translated. Jesus is the *only* Son of the Father; He has no equal; He is *sui generis* (this was one meaning of *monogenês*, as Bultmann notes in his Commentary); and He is therefore the Revealer, the *only* Revealer, of the Father, the *only* Redeemer of men.

Thus the Biblical usage, the standard being set by the Septuagint, reflects both the heavy and the light translation (i.e. both translation and over-translation). The same thing is found in contemporary ancient literature. Josephus, for example, in his *Antiquities* I. 222 (=I. 13.1) reads, "Abraham loved Isaac exceedingly (almost too much: *hyperagapa*), being his only (*monogenês*) son and born to him on the threshold of old age, by the goodness of God." In II. 181 (=II.7.4), "Dan had only one infant, Ousis." In the early Christian writing, the *Epistle to Diognetus* (10:2), the word is used in the sense of *only*; and in the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* (20:2), in the ascription at the end, Christ is God's only (or only-begotten) Child. In Wisdom 7:22, the Spirit of Wisdom is only (or only-begotten). But so is the Sign of Aquarius, according to the astrologers (Vettius Valens I.2=p. 11, line 32 Kroll). Antoninus Liberalis the mythographer (*Mythographi Graeci*, II, ch. 32:1 Martin) uses the word of an only daughter (Dryope).

It is obvious that in ordinary use *monogenês* did not carry any more weight than *monos* (=only). As Moulton and Milligan point out in their *Vocabulary of the Greek Testament* (London, 1930, p. 416f), *monogenês* is literally "one of a kind," "only," "unique" (*unicus*), not "only-begotten" (which would not be *monogenês* but *monogennêtos* (*unigenitus*)). It was the Septuagint which began the over-translation; and the Septuagint was done, for the most part, by men who had a rather imperfect knowledge of Greek (the Septuagint translation of the Song of Deborah, for example, is probably the worst exhibit of mis-translation in all literature!). The sexual connotation in "begotten" (as part of this word) had long since faded (see Hesiod and Herodotus, above), and in religious circles the word was either more or less equivalent to "beloved" (see Cuthbert Turner's famous article in the *Journal*

of *Theological Studies*, XXVII, 1926, pp. 113-129) or meant "one of a kind" (as Rudolf Bultmann notes: see his Comm. on John in the Meyer series, Göttingen, 1937, pp. 47ff; see also Ferdinand Kattenbusch, "Only Begotten", in Hastings's *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, II (1912), 281f, and his *Das Apostolische Symbol*, II, 581ff).

For later patristic references to the use of the word, as well as the Gnostic use (it was one of their favorite words), see—in addition to Hort's great *Dissertation* (1875), and Westcott on John 1:18—E. A. Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods*, New York, 1887, p. 766, and J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 1950, pp. 141-143. "About the middle of the second century the word was becoming a cliché with the Valentinian Gnostics. Possibly inspired by the Fourth Gospel, they were tending to monopolize it as a designation for their aeon Nous, making a sharp distinction between *monogenês* and the historical figure Jesus" (ib., p. 142). The emphasis on the *-genês* syllables in the word, among the Fathers, was probably due to the controversy over the Eternal Generation, which seemed to be guaranteed or safeguarded by the term. But of course the New Testament was not written especially for the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th century theologians, but for ordinary Christians in the first century and at all times. The echoes of *monogenês* in the ancient myths, in Orphism and the Hermetica (see Walter Bauer's Commentary on John in the *Handbuch* series, 3d ed., 1933, p. 26) and in the magical papyri and in Gnosticism, undoubtedly contained overtones for some Christians in the first or second century, but they certainly contain none for those of the twentieth. The great Catholic doctrine of the Eternal Generation is not safeguarded, for us, by over-translating a Greek word. After all, the second half of the compound, "only-begotten", is only a figure: the Eternal Son is not really "begotten", as in some triad of deities, with a feminine member who acts as wife and mother; the Catholic doctrine is more clearly stated, in modern language, as "eternally-generated," or "eternally-derived"—the Son is not "begotten", once for all as an event; He is eternally derived, generated (not "born", and certainly not "made," as the ancient heretics held) from the Eternal Father.

It is always a temptation for us, at least for us who prize our share in the life and faith of the Church Universal, and count "orthodox" for something other than a term of reproach, to go beyond the normal limits set by the usage of the Church—in brief, it is a temptation for us to try to be *more* orthodox than the Church itself. For example, the ancient Roman Creed (basically our Apostles Creed) said *unicus* (for

monogenês), just as we still do, "His *only* Son, our Lord." Some of the Fathers (e.g. Dionysius, ca. 259 A.D.) were content with the phrase (in their Creed), "His Son," without either *only* or *only-begotten*. Even St. Leo the Great used *unicum*! And even the *Ordo Romanus*, and the *Roman Catechism*, retain it! (See A. E. Burn, *Int. to the Creeds*, 1899, p. 46; A. Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der Alten Kirche*, 1897, pp. 27, 30, 32.) But who ever heard anyone describe his son or daughter as "my only-begotten son" or "my only-begotten daughter"? The truth is, modern English says the same thing—and better—with its clean, swift-moving, briefer and more pointed idiom. And when one thinks of it, perhaps the great truth expressed in the Gospel of St. John is better expressed, and better safeguarded, in *modern English*, by the perfectly correct, entirely accurate, and theologically far more adequate expression, "only Son," than in the cumbersome, antiquated (antiquated even in 1611) translation, "only-begotten Son." One needs only to study it a little, and the Greek behind it, and to become a little more familiar with the new version as a whole, to realize the superiority of the present rendering of John 1:14, 18.

THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE IN CONTEMPORARY CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By "BOHEMICUS"

A most paradoxical situation resulting from the Communist attempt at regulating its relations with the non-Roman Catholic segments of the population is the tremendous upsurge of first-rate theological and church-historical publications by the Protestants since 1948.

Before the Communist seizure of power, and especially before World War II, there were a number of publishing houses, denominational and independent, specializing in religious literature. It was only natural that, in a country where non-Roman Catholics formed only about ten per cent of the population, the financial backing of these publishing enterprises was weak and the results correspondingly meagre. With the advent of the Communist régime all Protestant publishing firms were consolidated into one strong book concern, the Kalich (i.e. the "Chalice," with apologies to the symbol of the Hussite Reformation), which heretofore served only as a denominational

printing establishment of the Czech Brethren Evangelical Church. In addition, the Government, in a very unabashed move to curry favor with the Protestants of Czechoslovakia, heavily subsidized the publication of high-class scholarly literature by the Protestant Theological Faculty. And, it must be admitted, the Protestants have taken excellent advantage of the favorable trade winds and have sent to the presses works of unparalleled quality as well as quantity. Let us survey briefly the literary results.

In the first place, the John Hus Theological Faculty (renamed in 1951 the Comenius Protestant Theological Faculty, after the creation of a separate Hus Theological Faculty for the National Czechoslovak Church by the Government) began publishing the life work of Ferdinand Hrejsa, Professor Emeritus of Ecclesiastical History, entitled *Dejiny krestanství v Československu* (History of Christianity in Czechoslovakia), beginning with the first missionary activity in the sixth century A.D. and, so far, ending with the year 1576. Up to now six volumes of some 400 pages each have made their appearance. Another faculty member, F. M. Bartos, who is the undisputed authority in the area of the Hussite Reformation and from whose prolific pen came many studies, monographs, and books which all are indispensable for a student of Hussitica, published two books, *Svetci a kacíři* (Saints and Heretics, 1949, pp. 334), presenting studies of less known personalities of the era of Saint Wenceslas, of the Church-Slavonic Rite, and of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation period; and *Knihy a zápasy* (Books and Struggles, 1948, pp. 384), which, in a similar vein, contains some seventy historical studies. Dr. Milos Bic, a promising scholar and pupil of the famous hittitologist Hrozný, head of the Old Testament Department, published three splendidly documented and illustrated volumes of *Palestina od praveku ke krestanství* (Palestine from Antiquity to Christianity).

From the Anglican point of view most interesting is the activity evidenced by the theological department which reflects a renaissance of interest in matters of doctrine, creed, and liturgy; in this respect, Czechoslovakia is no exception, Communism and Hromadka notwithstanding, to the theological trends in the rest of continental Europe. The entire faculty of Comenius Theological Faculty, under the direction of Professor F. M. Dobiáš and Docent Amedeo Molnár, co-operated in publishing in 1951 *Ctyři vyznání* (Four Confessions). This scholarly symposium of 413 pages prints verbatim (in Czech)

the four historic creeds of Christendom: the Apostles', Nicene, Chalcedonian, and Athanasian Creeds, and traces the development of their salient principles in the Four Articles of Prague (presented by the Hussites to the Council of Basel), the Augsburg Confession, the *Confessio Fratrum Bohemicorum* (the so-called "Moravian Confession") with the 1564 preface by John Amos Comenius, the Second Helvetic Confession of Bullinger of 1566, and the Confession of Bohemia, presented in 1575 to Emperor Maximilian II by the priests of the Neo-Utraquist Church (Moravian). The book is richly documented and is furnished with a critical apparatus and charts comparing the main theological ideas of the creeds and symbols analyzed. Detailed alphabetic notes facilitate the finding of the seminal doctrines, and an index of biblical and patristic references, as well as a comparative table, are an invaluable help to the student of the historic creeds of continental Europe. It should be noted that this book, like most of those published by the Faculty, contains a French resumé. If we regret that no attention has been given in this first rate work to the formularies of the British Isles, we must remember that this work was designed to meet primarily the needs of the Central European reader who is naturally interested in those church symbols which have directly affected his own church.

The salutary trend of studying afresh and re-evaluating the "church fathers" of the Bohemian Reformation is attested by the publication of the sermons of Master Jacobellus de Stribro, *Kazani Mistra Jakoubka*, who was primarily responsible for the renewed emphasis on the centrality of the sacrament of the altar and to whose credit goes the re-introduction of the chalice and the communion in both kinds of the laity in 1415; and, more recently, by the work of Docent Amedeo Molnar, *Bratr Lukás Bohoslovec Jednoty* (Brother Lucas—The Theologian of the Moravian Church, 1948, pp. 157). An Anglican student finds this study of particular interest, for Lucas of Prague who is the theologian *par excellence* of the Bohemian and Moravian Reformation, and much more systematic and penetrating than John Hus, struck a theological note, especially in his concept of the Church, that is very close to the *via media*.

In preparation is a project that would have been beyond the wildest hopes of the Protestants before 1948, namely the systematic publication of all the writings of John Hus. This is a far cry from, let us say, A.D. 1944, when F. M. Bartos's study, *Biskupství v Jednote*

bratrské (The Episcopacy in the Unitas Fratrum)—which, by the way, is the most authoritative and scholarly work on the question of the episcopate, ordination, and apostolic succession in the Bohemian Churches—had to be printed in mimeographed form for lack of funds!

In order to sustain the interest of the Protestant clergy in these literary projects, the Comenius Theological Seminary of Prague together with the Tranoscius Theological Seminary of Bratislava (serving the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Slovakia) publish jointly *Theologia Evangelica*, a quarterly review of a format approximating that of the ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, with articles in both the Czech and Slovak languages. Brief synopses of articles are printed inside the covers of the quarterly, in French, English, and Russian (the most recent issue omitted the English summaries). In addition, the Academic YMCA publishes, in a more popular vein, a monthly paper, *Krestanská revue*.

I would not want to leave the impression that only Kalich and the theological faculties print church historical works. Other publishing firms, some of them out-and-out Communist, publish a veritable flood of literature on the Hussite era. "Anti-Vaticanism" being one of the aspects of the official Communist party line, it is not entirely surprising that the Communist intelligentsia views John Hus and the Bohemian Reformation with a rather odd sympathetic curiosity. An example of this Communist interest in the past of Bohemia is the most recent study of Josef Macek, professor of sociology at Prague University, *Husitské revolucní hnutí* (The Hussite Revolutionary Movement, Prague: Rovnost, 1952, pp. 2003). It is significant that the Communist literati hesitate to use the term "reform" or "reformation," always substituting the word so dear to Communists, "revolution." While it is undoubtedly true that the Hussite Reformation, like any other mass upheaval, had social and economic consequences, and while we might agree with the author that the Czech church historians of the past neglected to study this phase of the religious movements in Bohemia, Professor Macek goes to the other extreme of interpreting the Hussite reformation solely within the context of economic determinism; thus, in his ingenious acrobatics, Hus is re-assessed exclusively in terms of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Gottwald. The uninitiated and naive reader might finish this book with the impression that, after all, John Hus was really the spiritual father of Communism, who used the names of God and faith

only as a pretext, a "bourgeois lingo" with which to transform the bourgeois-feudal society into a "kingdom of God on earth, a medieval term equivalent to the classless society of the working people, a millennial dream come true only today" (p. 12).

Of like tendency is Professor Macek's earlier book, *Ktož jsu Boží bojovníci* (You Who Are Warriors of God, Prague: Melantrich, 1951, pp. 344), sumptuously published and well illustrated and containing selected readings of authentic Hussite papers and letters about Tabor and the "Hussite revolutionary movement." Some of the papers are first-rate historical documents, not hitherto available to the public, but the value of the whole book is made questionable by the introduction and commentaries in the familiar Marxian vein, and by some "documents" that caused this reviewer at least to wonder how many of the lines were authentic Hussite substrata and how many more were later Marxian deposits. In reading the recent Communist literature invading and appropriating even the area of religion, one is uncomfortably reminded of the depressing atmosphere in Orwell's "1986."

So many of the works of Comenius as well as books about him have been published in the last three years, some reliable and some "edited," that the present writer hopes to review them separately in the near future.

There are indications that the policy of friendly "containment" toward the Protestants by the Czech Communists is nearing its end. Just as he was closing this article, it was brought to the attention of the reviewer that Kalich, the central publishing agency of Czech Protestantism mentioned above, is in the process of liquidation under pressure of the Prague government. What this will spell for the future of Protestant literature in Bohemia is hard to know. What will happen to the grand project of the *Biblický slovník* (Biblical Dictionary), of which the first four volumes have appeared since the close of 1951, is anybody's guess. This dictionary, published by Kalich, was set up on a scale and quality of which not even a great nation would be ashamed.

Whether the Protestants in Czechoslovakia will be able to continue their marvelous activity or whether they will be compelled to "witness in silence" as in the days of the Nazi occupation or in the earlier dark days of Roman-Catholic Inquisition, the tangible evidence of their recent theological and church-historical activity is an

eloquent proof that the followers of John Hus in Czechoslovakia are proud of the heritage of their Church, that they have not lost the vision of the City of God, and that, even though hemmed in by the City of Man, they will not forswear their primary allegiance to the Lord of all history.

AN EVALUATION OF LOTZE'S THEISM

By TAYLOR E. MILLER

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Every individual thinker who contributes to the world's knowledge through the realm of creativity stands at an apex point in history. He must not only depend upon but must immerse himself in the past. He feels intensely the implications of his own personal life in its relations to the present. And he is led by an insight into the future that is characterized by hope. Hermann Lotze is such a man. He stands at a point that may be designated as the middle of the nineteenth century, for he lived just within its borders, 1807-1881. His thought stands in close relationship to the two great streams that have come down from Plato and Aristotle. In fact he seems to be at the point where the two find a synthesis in the recognition of the reality of both the idea and the scientific particular. He walks with "his head in the clouds" and "his feet on the ground".

The two fields of metaphysics and empirical science which had grown so far apart or had become stagnant in the scholastic tradition of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas are brought into new relationships in Lotze and made vibrant by the stimulating impressions that each receives from the other. This tends toward a monism that yet does not deny the dualistic character of the method through which knowledge is given. Here the facts of objective experience are equaled in validity by those of subjective reflection. The series of forms of thought are a systematic whole as developed out of the problems or tasks of thinking. The two work together toward a single objective and the result is an intermingling of effects that are stimulating to both fields.

The vital activity as the spiritual essence of the real world has the good as its end, and this justifies Lotze's thought that all metaphysics has its beginning in ethics. The natural law of probability is the form in

which the activity works. The conception of value is very essential, for it conforms to the type of good that Kant characterized in his *Summum Bonum* as that which would be good for every individual. Lotze had studied medicine and the physical sciences under Volkmann, and where Hegelianism had given way to pure natural science Lotze helped philosophy regain a place of honor in the hierarchy of the sciences. He studied the movements of thought in positivism, materialism, criticism, and post-Kantian idealism, and rejected the extremes of each while retaining the essential core of truth. He tended to reject the theory of the *a priori* and subjective idealism and also the dialectical methods of a large part of the German school, although he might be classified as a descendant of German idealism.

He agreed with Kant's position in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that there can be no knowledge in science and philosophy without experience. He also held with positivism that there cannot be a system of metaphysics possessing absolute certainty, and thus intimated the superiority of the subjective realm partially because of its unknowability. He combined the monadology of Leibnitz with the pantheism of Spinoza and sought to reconcile monism and pluralism, mechanism and teleology, realism and idealism, pantheism and theism. He called this theory "teleological idealism." It affirmed an ethical-religious idealism, which was also expressed by Fichte, as well as a scientific interpretation of natural phenomena.

In his emphasis on the natural sciences, Lotze said that one cannot understand interaction or causal efficiency as the influence of one thing on another without regarding the manifold processes of nature as states of one and the same all-comprehending substance. He sought complete oneness in regard to matter. There was a suggestion of idealistic pantheism which is one way out when one considers the theistic principle. But Lotze carried his monistic emphasis through to the subjective realm, for he interpreted the universal substance as the highest reality we know; that is personality, a good being, the God of love.

Kant's moral "ought" shows up very strongly in Lotze. There is provision for the three factors in teleology: ground, cause, and end. This often reveals the limitations of Spinoza, Herbert, Hegel and others who fail to consider all three. The idealism of Schelling and Hegel attempted to deduce all from the Absolute, but they failed because of their reach beyond human power. They despised mechanism and missed the factor which Lotze realised was so essential. The works that he wrote on the subject of mechanism are generally respected for their factual

integrity. *Pathology, Life and Life-Force, Physiology, and Medical Psychology* are the major works in this field.

Volkmann had led him carefully through the paths of the medical sciences and was his intimate friend as well as respected adviser. The fact that Weisse in the field of philosophy had not cut sharply across the lines of the natural had also been of great help to Lotze. Through two fine personalities and true scholars he had found respect for both fields, so that he was later able to bring them together without loss of prestige for either. Lotze was recognized as being opposed to Fichte, for his *Controversial Writings* were a sharp reply to that writer. Though he was actually opposed to Herbart he has often been considered as one of the Herbartian school because, in the third part of *Metaphysics*, he described sensations as self-assertions of the soul when disturbed.

Lotze was led into the study of philosophy by a strong feeling for poetry and art. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel had each developed ideas into a well-expressed mode of culture rather than into a finished system of doctrine. Lotze longed for ever finer expressions of culture, but his scientific training made his expression even more beautiful in that it was orderly. As medicine led him to the realization of the necessity for natural science, he cut the ground from under many of Hegel's views. His realism, theory of simple essences, and perception of truth (causality occurs only where there is a plurality of causes) put firm emphasis on the various effects of the objective world. If anyone showed him the way to this thought, it was Leibnitz with his theory of monads.

Though Herbart arouses an antipathy in him, his fundamental theory is like that of Fichte. The idea of the good is sufficient ground for all existence. Moral values are the key to forms. Yet Lotze doesn't restrict the good to the domain of action. He shows the blissful calm of inactive contemplation, and here in his poetry and art he often seems to soar off into the realm of the mystic. Weisse and George are the only Germans who can come up to him in intellectual grasp and acuteness of discernment. His seeking mind ranges far, and seems never to reach its boundaries as it is especially characterized by a lack of dogma. He was truly a philosopher who lived up to the highest concept of his profession. He sought truth and that alone. Perhaps this led him away from the primary motive of a school. His investigative spirit was so strong that he often found it hard to lead his students through the many individual pathways necessary to their development. Rather, he sought to drive directly to the essential point to be considered and often left his students behind. But then, appreciating their dilemma,

he would return to them and find his greatest truths in simple expression.

Lotze sustains Fechner in *Nanna* as regards the likeness of plants and animals, but warns against going too far in the theory of types. He was continually tempering abstract systems of smooth appearance with the rough edges of practical situations. He put man in the highest place in the scale of knowable things and insisted that going beyond man was unstable inquiry. But Lotze carried animate existence farther down the scale than Fechner since he held that the elements of that which is material in animals also have feeling. He rejects on the other side the idea that celestial bodies have souls and here criticizes Herbart and Hegel.

Fuller makes the statement that Lotze attempted to bring all psychophysical phenomena within the bounds of a strictly mechanical theory.¹ It is possible to agree with Mr. Fuller if he holds to the definition of science, viz., that it is a verified hypothesis applicable to many related phenomena. But the term "related" must be borne clearly in mind. There is no attempt to confine these phenomena to the realm of the logical positivist in that they are of one type. They are merely related. Mr. Fuller's words, "strictly mechanical," rather refuse this point as they suggest a limited range to the objective. It is only as they are kept on the level of the purely theoretical that they can fulfill this precise definition. It must also be made clear that Lotze gave a large place to emotion without cutting it adrift from his main emphasis on logic. Here again he was influenced by Leibnitz and Weissé who attacked the over-emphasis of Hegel on the head with too little notice of the heart.

Even scientific knowledge was seen by Lotze as an act of faith in the existence of truth and in the power of reason to attain it. This faith cannot be proved any more than the validity of our conviction that phenomena exist or that values like beauty and goodness are real. His theism was supreme in showing how the demands of phenomenal fact, of logical truth and of moral value can be met by one and the same world. He attacked Fichte's view that there can be no ego without a non-ego and therefore interaction and intercommunication are necessary to personal self-consciousness. This was a further step toward the monism of the whole. He said that self-consciousness is bound up with the mere fact of existence in and for itself whether or not the thing so existing has a non-ego with which to contrast itself. This suggests

¹B. A. G. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 501.

different degrees of self-consciousness. Perhaps human personalities need contrast, but not God who is the ultimate degree.

Like Fechner and Von Hartmann, he was not only spiritualistic in metaphysics but was one of the founders of experimental and physiological psychology. His reliance on the scientifically objective was always apparent in this seeming digression from the natural. Another contemporary, who was like Lotze in representing not only Kantian and spiritualistic motives but the influence of science as well, was Renouvier. It is interesting to note that Lotze, Wundt, and Ward, mentioned together previously, were all physiologists. But Weber and Perry relate Lange to Lotze and Ritschl in respect to the judging of ideals independently of their reference to fact.² Lotze was by no means bound to the limits of the contemporary natural science of his day. He drew on it largely for methods and recognized the hypothetical character of many facts.

Lotze's work in aesthetics was significant in anticipating the theory of empathy, *Einfühlung*, according to which the enjoyment of aesthetics in form, such as symmetry, is occasioned by the perception of corresponding movements and tensions in the organism. Again science and beauty were closely related, and there was further suggestion of the monism of the one source. Faith in reason is the only final base of all knowledge, and the emotion of beauty and the logic of symmetry are equal pillars on this base. Since all of the elements of reality react to one another in a way that is determined, to a great extent, it must be concluded that the nature of each is implicated in the nature of the rest, or that all parts are of one substance which is a vitally connected whole. Thus Lotze's ultimate view of nature is monistic rather than monadistic, and here he definitely modifies the view of Leibnitz.

The key to all of this is that the substance or the whole, itself, recognizes such changes and parts as its own. Only spiritual subjects exercise this function and can be regarded as ultimately real.³ We follow the trail of these subjective particulars through our finite selves to God. Lotze really illustrates the two sides of the problem of knowledge as he shows intelligence fashioning its world out of that which is exceedingly indefinite, and also follows a webwork of things and relations that is supplied by nature. He feels that each of these two emphases is necessary, for they both supply a lack, but then he goes on to show that they are contained in each other. Yet many times it seems hard for

²Alfred Weber and Ralph Barton Perry, *History of Philosophy*, p. 466.

³*Microcosmus*, Bk. 9, Ch. 3; *Metaphysics*, Bk. 1, Ch. 7

him to make a choice between the two, and perhaps this makes him more instructive in the recognition of the problem. Too many of the world's thinkers have been completely one-sided on the question. Theism demands both sides for its explanation. Lotze had the extraordinary power that so many have copied since his time of seeing both sides in this particular problem, and he would not avert his eyes from either.⁴

From the position of the general doctrine of being or ontology he makes a positive assertion. Like Hegel and Herbart, in providing a constructive system he gives first place to a general discussion of the most universal characteristics that we find ourselves constrained to ascribe in thought to any reality. All attempts to formulate a theory of the way in which the *what* of things flows from a mere *that*, are attempts to answer the absurd question as to how *being* is made.⁵ The notion that things have a *that* or substance, prior to their *what* or quality, and consisting simply in being, which is not this or that determinate mode of being, is thus without meaning as well as superfluous.

As demands vary from time to time, the behavior of the part under consideration will then vary correspondingly, though to all appearance its surroundings may, for a spectator who fails to grasp the end or purpose realized by the system, be identical.⁶ There is no ultimate logical principle in virtue of which we are constrained to think of the particular quantities we denote as mass and energy as incapable of increase or diminution. Nor again have we any experimental means of proving that those quantities are more than approximately constant. Here is recognition of future possible discoveries about matter, such as atomic fission. But in order to calculate, there is needed some quantitative identity as an *a priori* postulate of mechanical construction.⁷ This postulation is made possible through the use of the function of intelligence. "The most solid part of our conviction was that the highest, most unbending, most general and most necessary law anywhere presented to us by the world is but the self-imposed condition on which the one creative infinite has based its eternal evolution."⁸ Brightman states this whole position in a very comprehensive phrase when he says that Lotze combines theism with an idealistic view of nature.⁹

⁴Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought*, p. 58.

⁵*Metaphysics*, Bk. I, Chs. 1 & 2.

⁶*Metaphysics*, Bk. I, Ch. 3, Sec. 33; Bk. I, Ch. 7, Sec. 208 ff.

⁷*Metaphysics*, Bk. 2, Ch. 7.

⁸*Microcosmus*, p. 395.

⁹E. S. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, p. 159.

Microcosmus has rich empirical material and it is from this background that Lotze speaks with a new voice. He turned the field of philosophy from its metaphysical trend toward abstractness and brought it down to earth. He sank his foundations deep into the soil of personal experience and was ever mindful of the objective reflections of that experience. Yet he did not lose the subjective point of view. It was really his starting point and he never left it for the ease of scientific complacency.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Concise History of the Law of Nations. By Arthur Nussbaum. Rev. ed. Macmillan, 1954, pp. xiii + 376. \$5.00.

This is a new and enlarged edition of the work by the well known retired research professor of Public Law at Columbia University, which first appeared in 1947. The present edition contains as new features certain developments in the East comparable to those in the West, including a section on Russian theory and practice. These are limited in value, as writers must keep within the scope of the Soviet dogma of opposition to Western "bourgeois" ideas (p. 287). Other additions and revisions include a most illuminating appendix taking issue with the late James Brown Scott's claim as to the superiority of the Spanish Scholastics over Hugo Grotius. This discussion is of importance as it seems to the reviewer that, while giving due regard to the significance of Suárez, a Jesuit, and Vitoria, a Dominican, it shows that their work was clearly not of the same degree of significance as that of Grotius. This great Dutch professor (1583-1645) is depicted as the leader who "presented for the first time a far-flung system of international law acceptable to all states" (p. 73), his greatest work being his *De jure belli et pacis*. His tolerance was notable for "a pious Protestant writing at the time of the most savage of religious wars; [he] refrained from any word which might offend Catholic feeling" (p. 109). He was the first writer "not to suggest discrimination against Saracens and other infidels" (p. 110). We should also remember him with special gratitude for his *Mare liberum* doctrine. In spite of these and other merits the *De jure* was placed on the *Index* in 1626 and not removed until 1899. The author believes that this fact, together with the difficult reconciliation of the heresy conception in Roman Catholic dogma with the view of modern international law, is responsible for

the situation that, since Grotius, the leading authors on the subject have been Protestant (p. 136), including Vattel, who had a profound influence here in the early days of the Republic.

The title used in the book under review, "Law of Nations," is practically equivalent to what is generally today called "International Law," whose main developments are recorded from a few events before the Christian Era, such as the first recorded treaty in 3100 B.C. between two Mesopotamian States, to the present custom of multi-lateral treaties under the auspices of the United Nations Assembly.

Dr. Nussbaum, who made a distinguished reputation before the recent war as Professor of Law at the University of Berlin, deals with his subject historically under seven main chapter headings, namely: Antiquity, The Middle Ages, West; The Middle Ages, East; Modern Times until the Thirty Years War; from the Peace of Westphalia to the Napoleonic Wars; from the Congress of Vienna to World War I; from the Treaty of Versailles to World War II. There are satisfactory notes with bibliographical references and a competent index. Although scarcely to be recommended to the general reader to put on his list for relaxing summer reading, it is an interesting and most competent and well arranged reference work of value to all concerned with the development of International Law in its various aspects. These include such different fields as Mercantile and Maritime Law; the Law affecting Consuls; Private International Law; the Law of War and its humanization; Peace Treaties; and Arbitration, in which the 1872 Alabama case between Great Britain and the United States is called "the most famous arbitration decision," and the attempt to establish Peace Leagues and International Courts.

Certain sections of the book contain data of special interest to those concerned with the history and influence of the Christian Church. Among these are the revival by St. Augustine of the Roman doctrine of just war, "altered in the Christian Spirit" (p. 35) and given the authority of the Church by St. Thomas Aquinas; the influence, spread by the Church as a goal, of Isaiah's prophecy that "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more," the proclamation by the Medieval Church of "Truces of God" when all feuds were prohibited; the pronouncement by the third Lateran Council (1179) against the enslavement of prisoners; the first project for the reconstruction of the political world and the attainment of world peace through a general council of prelates and Christian princes (p. 43); the devoted efforts of the greatest of the founders of international law,

Grotius, to the cause of Church reunion (p. 106); the development of treaties protecting religious minorities; from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) on until 1782 when a commercial treaty between the United States and the Netherlands granted "the first unlimited expression of tolerance by guaranteeing the most perfect freedom of conscience and worship to all subjects of the other party" (p. 126).

The reading of the book confirms the impression that the most ambitious attempts to organize the nations for peaceful cooperation, although far from being fully successful, have been worth while, and that the world will ultimately be a better place to live in because of the efforts of the League of Nations and the United Nations, organizations to which the churches—Catholic, Protestant and Jewish—have, on the whole, been loyal.

ANSON PHELPS STOKES

The Transformation of the Scientific World View. By Karl Heim. Harper, 1953. pp. 258. \$3.50.

This is the title of the English translation of Vol. II of Karl Heim's important study of the relationship of the Christian faith to a scientifically-conditioned age. Vol. I was published a year earlier under the title, *The Christian Faith and Natural Science*, and dealt with the general presuppositions of modern culture as they affect modern man's religious thinking. This volume continues the exploration, dealing with the significance for Christians of the changes which have taken place on the higher levels of philosophical physics.

Dr. Heim shows that the perennial scientific quest has been for an absolute certainty in terms of which the meaning of the relative relationships within the universe can be appreciated with some assurance. The traditional areas in which this certainty has been sought are those of "the absolute object," "absolute time and space," and "absolute determinism in natural events."

He then shows how scientific studies have undercut what has been held to be certain in each of the areas. First of all these studies resulted in pushing back certainty to more basic principles, as in the movement from the Newtonian concept of the nature of matter to the one resulting from the work of Maxwell and Rutherford in the field of electric energy. Similar results occurred in the accepted understanding of absolute time and space and absolute determinism, as old concepts were undercut and more basic principles uncovered.

The modern world, however, has reached a stage where major philosophical physicists are prepared to abandon completely their feeling

that there are any such absolutes. The infinite regression is seen to be circular thinking, and a new understanding of the universe is called for. Yet, as Dr. Heim points out, man cannot think at all without some certainty, nor can he communicate to his fellow men without some assurance of common experiences.

But the collapse of all such self-imposed constructions of the human mind has been only the negative preparation for a final acknowledgment of a remarkably positive character. God, the Creator, who stands as the Eternal beyond all our systems, is the sole Absolute. We trace the power of those unconditional decisions which He alone is able to make in the irrevocable "placing" which has allocated to us our place in space and time. In all the change of appearances, our eternal point of rest is in God alone (p. 118).

Again, in his final dealing with the problem of causal determinism, Dr. Heim says,

The marvellous peacefulness in God which comes upon us in such a situation [viz. that of trust] is the secret of all genuine acceptance of prayer. Jesus makes it clear, in His saying about the removal of the mountain into the sea in response to believing prayer, that this acceptance has nothing to do with magic, black or white, but rests solely on the fact that the man who prays becomes, at the moment of his praying, an instrument of the active God in whose hands he rests (pp. 167 f).

This is an important book. We are indebted to Dr. Heim for taking the next major step beyond that reached by Eddington, Jeans, and Whitehead a generation ago. His grasp of the existential aspect of vital religion makes it possible for him to do so. Certainly the last word on the subject has yet to be written, but for the present here is the mountain peak of synthesis.

CHARLES D. KEAN

A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas. Fascicles III, IV, and V (I-M, N-Q, and R-Z). By Roy J. Deferrari. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1949, pp. 496-1185. \$12.50 each.

In the April 1950 issue of this journal there were reviews of Fascicles I and II of the *Lexicon*. Now with the assistance of Sister M. Inviolata Barry, C. D. P., of San Antonio, Texas, and Ignatius McGuiness, O. P., of the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, D. C., Dr. Deferrari has brought to a successful conclusion this monumental work. The result is an indispensable tool for the student of St. Thomas.

Although the *Lexicon* is primarily of the *Summa Theologica*, it includes "selected passages of other works" such as the *Summa contra Gentiles*, and commentaries on Aristotle, Peter Lombard, Boethius, and the Scriptures.

The words of the *Summa Theologica* are set forth alphabetically with their various English meanings and, where possible, Thomas' own definition. Each meaning and illustrative passage is keyed to the text, i.e. the Leonine Edition (1888-1906) of the *Summa Theologica* and the Vives edition for the other works. Some idea of the thoroughness of the study may be obtained from the fact that *Natura* is dealt with in three and half full quarto pages.

A quotation may help to give the reader some hint as to the method.

Sacrificio, are, avi, atum, 1, v. n. and a., to make or offer a sacrifice, to sacrifice, (1) neuter, (a) absol., (b) with dat., (2) act., (3) pass.—(1) (a), ut populus ad sacrificiandum promptus huiusmodi sacrificia magis Deo quam idolis offeret, PS. Q. 102. Art. 3c. Cf. SS.Q. 64. Art. 44 Ob. 1; SS.Q. 81 Art. 1 (bis); SS.Q. 84 Art. 1 ad 1; SS. Q. 94 Art. 2c; SS. Q. 152 Art. 2 (ter).—(1) (b), ad evitandum idolatrarum cultum qui in tali tempore lunae sacrificabunt, PS. Q. 102 Art. 4 ad 10.—(2), sacrificare sacrificium iustitiae, PS. Q. 91. Art. 2c.—(3), secundum quam in omni loco Deo sacrificature, SS.Q. 84. Art. 3 ad 1; animal autem quod non poterat sacrificari SS. Q. 88. Art. 10 ad 1.

ALDEN DREW KELLEY

The Mind of Kierkegaard. By James Collins. Chicago: Regnery, 1953, pp. xiv + 304. \$4.50.

The author, Associate Professor of Philosophy in Saint Louis University, has put us in debt for a long time to come by his study of the philosophy of Kierkegaard. The reviewer, who first encountered S. K. about fifteen years ago and, like most American students then, went through a painful and floundering process in an effort to get hold of the gist of Kierkegaard's thought, would have welcomed such a book for a guide. To date there has been little help available other than Lowrie's *Kierkegaard*, Swanson's *Something About Kierkegaard*, Geismar's *Lectures on the Religious Thought of Soren Kierkegaard*, and Thomte's work, *Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion*. All of these have had their limitations, notably the assumption that the reader had first mastered all of Kierkegaard's writings!

Collins treats Kierkegaard neither as a theologian nor a philosopher

but as a "religious thinker" and poet. In eight chapters, the author gives an introduction to the intellectual life of his subject and then goes on to discuss in order The Sphere of Existence and the Romantic View, The Ethical View and Its Limits, The Attack upon Hegelianism, The Meaning of Existence, The Nature of the Human Individual, Becoming a Christian in Christendom, and concludes with an essay on Kierkegaard and Christian Philosophy. The thought of Kierkegaard is set within his immediate philosophical situation with particular reference to Kant and Hegel and at the same time considered within the wider stream of Christian thought, philosophical and theological, as found in Augustine and Thomas. An effort is made to show that Kierkegaard's viewpoint can be easily related to, incorporated within, and illuminated by Thomistic teaching. Here the author follows somewhat the line laid down by Gilson (*L'être et l'essence*, Paris, Vrin, 1948) and less directly Marcel (*The Mystery of Being*, London, Harvil, 1951).

Comparisons [can be made] between Kierkegaard and the Christian wisdom of Augustine and Aquinas, who in their turn sought to rescue the best in Greek thought. No foolish claim is made that the Danish thinker falls within the category of an Augustinian or a Thomist philosophy. But the total view of life which these thinkers represent, does aid one in appreciating and weighing the many sides of Kierkegaard's genius. Direct comparisons are rendered difficult by the fact that he lacked first-hand acquaintance with many sources of Christian philosophy. . . . His thought displays significant points of contact with the Augustinian tradition, as it extends down into the modern world of Luther and Pascal. The connection with Aquinas is much more indirect, although no less real. It is to be found in their mutual respect for the metaphysical realism of Aristotle. Despite the wide differences in their intellectual milieus, Aquinas and Kierkegaard are united in an appreciation of the Greek approach to the problems of Being and Becoming (p. 244).

After pointing out that the interests of Aquinas were those of a professional philosopher and theologian—hence his method was more systematic—the author endeavors to illustrate fundamental agreement in five areas: "the starting-point of cognition, the modes of being, the nature of systematic speculation, the integrity of man, and the relation between faith and reason" (p. 245-268).

It is evident from Collins' discussion that he regards Aquinas as much more empirical and "existential" than do many other followers of Thomas; and that he sees in Kierkegaard a more clearly defined

metaphysical realism than is the case in the opinion of most interpreters of the Danish thinker.

Although the author's presuppositions are exposed by his evident desire to fit Kierkegaard into the Thomistic scheme, the book is no less reliable for that. The treatment is on the whole penetrating and marked by objectivity and sympathetic understanding.

ALDEN DREW KELLY

Faith and Culture. By Bernard E. Meland. Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. vii + 229. \$3.75.

Professor Meland has long been associated with the Chicago school of "process philosophers" and has written a number of books in which the Christian faith is presented in terms of that philosophy. In earlier days, he seemed to be in danger of reducing the faith to a kind of symbolization of the metaphysics of a process-philosophy. But in this volume, his latest, he shows sympathy for and considerable insight into the basic Christian affirmations, especially as these have been conveyed to us through the revived orthodoxy of the Protestant theologians of our time.

The early chapters of "Faith and Culture" are concerned with the dissipation of the Christian faith which resulted from the impact of scientific thought, new philosophical emphases, and sociological factors, all of them manifested in a culture which found the traditional Christian idiom beyond its comprehension. In succeeding chapters, Professor Meland discusses the return to a need for faith, the awakening to the persisting value of "myth" as part of the cultural pattern, and the place of Jesus Christ as "the basic event of our history, giving witness to [the] perception of good as sovereign for all existence."

With this background, the author proceeds to work through the problem of man's situation in the contemporary world, indicating the "depths" of human nature (often forgotten in older "liberalisms"), the difficulty of achieving goodness in human relations, and the need for "a redemptive good" which will sustain men through life and provide them with confidence in the face of death. The cross and resurrection of Christ are seen as symbols of this redemptive goodness, but Professor Meland is not content to leave them there—he points out their integral place in the total pattern of human relatedness in its cosmic setting.

A concluding chapter seeks to restate the Christian faith in the light

of the earlier analysis. In Jesus Christ we have "the mediator of [a] transcendent structure of meaning within the human community." Yet "transcendent" does not imply an intrusion into the process from outside it, but rather the sense of "a depth of mystery to which our structure of consciousness simply cannot attend except in a mood of awe as in a holy presence." This "transcendent structure of meaning" is said to "interpenetrate and subsume every other structure;" it is "the 'not yet' and 'beyond' of all that is."

I am impressed by this attempt to work out a consistent system of thought, in Christian terms, for our own time. With almost all of Dr. Meland's analysis and reconstruction, so far as I can understand it, I should wish to express agreement. My one doubt arises when he makes the fact of Christ's central position, as mediating the "transcendent structure", dependent upon our Lord's "consciousness" of that structure and therefore seems to imply a Christology which is, so to say, "mental" rather than "ontological." It would seem that following Dr. Meland's own line of thought, a more satisfactory statement would suggest that in the totality of human experience, and hence specifically and decisively in the very ontological reality of this given human life, the mediation is found to take place.

With this modification, and with certain consequent changes in the presentation of Christian faith in the last chapter, Dr. Meland's book is valuable in two respects: (1) that it shows the possibility of constructing an authentic Christian theology without returning to the implicit deism of so much of the "new orthodoxy," Catholic and Protestant; and (2) that it speaks significantly to those who, like this reviewer, feel that writers like Professor Charles Hartshorne, with their insistence on "panentheism," have made the first steps in a more profound and acceptable doctrine of God than much that is found in traditional western thought.

W. NORMAN PITTENGER

A Theology of the Living Church. By L. Harold DeWolf. Harper, 1954, pp. 383. \$5.00.

By the word *theology* Dr. DeWolf means "the critical discipline devoted to discovering, expounding, and defending the more important truths implied in the experience of the Christian community" (p.18), which "includes the experience of all persons who are bound together in the profession of a religious faith which they or others call Christian" (p. 22). The critical character of the study is necessitated by "negative implications. People called Christians have given many horrible exam-

ples of beliefs and practices which ought not to be embraced" (p. 22). This use of the word as a polite term to describe evaluation of various interpretations of the varieties of religious experience marks the character of the book. It doubtless presents clearly the position of many thousands of those who profess and call themselves Christians. It describes just as clearly how far removed they are from many other thousands, communicants of historic churches which regard theology as the reasonable explanation of a creed officially adopted, as explaining the worship, directing the discipline, and inspiring the conduct of their members.

A high churchman, whether Eastern Orthodox or Roman or Anglican, would even find it difficult to understand Dr. DeWolf's concept of *the Living Church*. He uses the term "organized church" to describe the aggregate of all organizations calling themselves churches or so-called by others (pp. 320-326), and he distinguishes this from "the spiritual church" (pp. 318-320) to which the name *Body of Christ* is applied, but "this is strictly true only at times. . . . Whenever and wherever a body of men and women have not the communion of the Holy Spirit, there is not the body of Christ." Therefore when St. Paul said to the Corinthians, *Ye are the Body of Christ*, "they knew what it was to be the church, but they were not always the church." The phrase is used as an adjective, not as a substantive.

The author's strange unfamiliarity with the habits and thought forms of historic and traditional churches is illustrated by his one-page summary of the seven sacraments "recognized by the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic bodies and likewise by many Anglo-Catholics" (p. 338). He says, "Baptism is a rite to be performed. . . either by immersion, pouring, or aspersion (sprinkling), but usually by aspersion"!!

Dr. DeWolf rightly emphasizes individual experience of union with God as the great purpose of the Church, but he does not always allow for the fact that all experience is usually effected and always conditioned by the principles of the group to which the individual belongs. This book will be valuable to all who are interested in making some kind of synthesis of religious thinking of the last hundred years. It will also be valuable for clarifying the difficulties which mark any attempts to produce union of historic and post-reformation churches.

ROYDEN KEITH YERKES

Existentialism and the Modern Predicament. By F. H. Heinemann. Harper, 1953, pp. vii + 211. \$3.50.

The author, a Professor at Oxford University and a staff member of *The Hibbert Journal*, has undertaken a critical summary and analysis of contemporary existentialism. After a discussion in order of Kierkegaard, Husserl, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, and Berdyaev, he raises the question of the validity of an existentialist philosophy. He shows that the existentialists have failed to produce a satisfactory metaphysics, logic, or ethics. In fact, these lie outside the realm of possibility by virtue of their very presuppositions and method.

This is not to say that existentialists have not contributed much to our contemporary understanding of man's predicament, his sense of alienation from the world, and his self-estrangement. There is considerable that is "living", i.e. relevant, in existentialist thought but as a constructive world-view it is "dead".

Where the existentialist substituted "I choose, therefore I am," for Descartes' "I think," Professor Heinemann suggests another key to reality, "I respond, therefore I am." Although this concept seems to be indirectly derived from Toynbee's historical studies, the author elucidates his hint in biological, psychological, sociological, ethical, and theological terms. As handled by Heinemann, "response" becomes a provocative and stimulating seminal idea which runs sharply counter to both the extreme subjectivism of the existentialists and the philosophical *cul-de-sac* into which we have been led by the linguistic analyses of the logical-positivists.

A bibliographical appendix adds to the usefulness of the book. However some will quarrel with the author's judgment that Berdyaev's most important work is *The Destiny of Man*. Much to be preferred, in my opinion, is *Freedom and the Spirit*.

The layman in philosophy may be heartened by the fact that even Professor Heinemann, who was partly responsible for introducing Heidegger to the English-speaking world, finds the exponent of "heroic defiance" completely baffling, self-contradictory, and nihilistic.

Not every reader, and least of all the reviewer, will agree with the author that "man's estrangement from God and from the Universe has nothing to do with the Fall." Perhaps the Fall is not the only element to be taken into account. But to exclude entirely man's sin seems an unjustifiable inference from the evident disjointedness of the structure of the universe.

Altogether this is an *important* book and one which seems likely to be influential in any reformulation, philosophical or theological, of a solution to the modern predicament.

ALDEN DREW KELLEY

Spiritual Authority in the Church of England. By E. C. Rich. Longmans, Green, 1953. pp. xxiv + 218. \$4.50.

This book is "an enquiry" into the principles of the Church of England, and in particular an examination of the nature of her spiritual authority. It picks its way through the historical problems of the Reformation, showing the Anglican appeal to scripture, tradition, and reason. A valuable chapter on "Newman's Challenge to Anglicanism" concludes the historical section, and we turn to more philosophic problems.

Here Canon Rich opens up the question of authority in religion, and argues that the concept of infallibility is valid; that under certain defined conditions the Church does declare, with freedom from error, the Mind of Christ and this must be obeyed as the Word of God. He urges against misusing the metaphor "Body of Christ" in such a way as to forget the earthly as well as heavenly nature of the Church. "The sovereignty of Christ in relation to His Church should be kept steadily in view. The Church always lies open before His Judgment. *All attempts either to separate Christ from His Church, or so to identify Him with her teaching authority as if she speaks always and everywhere as infallibly as the Incarnate Lord Himself, should be avoided as tending to destroy her twofold character*" (author's italics).

In his next chapter, "The Nature of the Church," Canon Rich argues that the doctrine of the mystical body holds out more promise of Christian reunion than the approach to the problem in terms of the "notes" of the Church. He claims that the former view is internal, the latter external; that the mystical body is not broken by the visible disunity of Christendom, and does not suffer the fragmentation shown by an existential view of the so-called One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church. He follows Père Conjar and Canon Quick in their theology of schism, and holds that all parts of the Church suffer deprivation by the loss of much vitality and spiritual experience.

In matters of "Holy Scripture and Tradition" he describes the latter as revelation *in actu*. "Tradition is the Church, as the living unity and

integrality of present, past and future, as God-manhood." Scripture remains supreme, as it checks all the rest of Church tradition.

At the end of the chapter on "The Authority of Doctrinal Interpretation" comes an appended note on the papal definition of the doctrine of the Assumption. Perhaps this is the weakest point in the book, for he argues from the *lex orandi* that East and West have grown to agree remarkably in their devotion and piety towards the Virgin. This leaves out the host of churches which have not persisted in the movement toward Mariolatry. The argument that the doctrine of the Assumption is true also advances along this line:

Probability passes almost imperceptibly into conviction that Mary's faith and her peculiar office in relation to the Incarnate Son of God and of the New Humanity in Christ means that she anticipated the final bliss of the blessed. 'From henceforth all generations shall call me blessed.' It would be in keeping with this consideration that she would already enjoy that 'perfect consummation and bliss both in body and soul' which revelation has declared to be the final destiny of all who 'fall asleep in Jesus.'

The limits of rational inquiry are then sharply drawn, and in this chapter there is much that scholars who love the historical-critical approach will not accept. The argument that we must reach a common mind on the historicity of the Virgin Birth and physical resurrection attempts to undercut the work of many of these men, and to undervalue the principles by which they make their contribution within the Body of Christ.

The conclusion exalts again the weighted force of tradition, and in the final paragraph the author aligns himself with Sir Thomas More:

More, after long deliberation, at last came to recognize that the Primacy of the Pope 'holdeth up all.' And this conviction he attributed not indeed to his critical judgment alone, but to the aid of the 'light supernatural.' It will have to be by the aid of the self-same light that others are brought to the same conclusion. There can be no other way of resolving the ultimate and otherwise irreconcilable dilemma between Reason and Authority.

Canon Rich's case rests on the assumption that the Church of England, by her separation from Rome, became divorced from the center of unity and lost the power of determining the development of the faith. "All that she could do was to defend what she had inherited." But Canon Rich admits she had inherited the catholic tradition of the

undivided Church, and held the Scriptures in her hand as the check against unwarranted additions to the faith. I cannot see why Anglicanism should consider submitting to a theological authority step by step moving ever farther away from the content and spirit of the Bible itself, however much Canon Rich may approve of these Roman additions to the faith. Clearly the defense must not rest, and its liberal-critical-rational arm must not weary.

RICHARD H. WILMER, JR.

The Psychology of Religion. By L. W. Grensted. Oxford University Press, 1952, pp. iv + 181. \$1.50.

This little book by Canon Grensted is packed with the wisdom and critical evaluations gained from years of experience in the field of psychology and religion. In some ways it bridges the gap between the rather academic results of the earlier "psychology of religion" investigations and the more recent application of analytical psychology to matters of faith. The author is emphatic in his insistence that it is not the task of psychology to prove or to disprove religion, but rather to observe, describe and record the facts of experience without engaging in ultimate interpretations. He concludes that "the findings of psychology are of less importance theoretically and of more importance practically than is commonly supposed to be the fact." Thus an understanding of psychology may help in promoting the movement toward wholeness—both physical and psychic—without encouraging judgment as to the ultimate meaning of that wholeness.

In his historical survey of modern psychology, Canon Grensted expresses a preference for Jung over Freud, and yet one might conclude from the number of crucial references to Freud's clinical observations that the preference is more theoretical than practical. The plain fact is that Freud is central to our understanding of the dynamics of human behavior. His interpretations—his *Weltanschauung*—constitutes a rival faith, but his eyes and ears *saw* and *heard* with astounding clarity. It is somewhat ironical that he did not learn from his contemporary, William James, who as the author of this book notes, made vivid the distinction between "the religious inspiration and goal and the psychological process by which that goal is reached."

Canon Grensted seems to be primarily concerned to set the record straight as to what we can expect from the study of psychology and its application to religion. His sober judgment in facing the limitations

of this discipline comes like a cool breeze in the welter of hot claims by specialists in *psychologism*. We need to be reminded that the channels of living water must be "hewed out" from time to time by man himself, but the springs of that water are affected neither by our neglect nor by our activity. This book helps in gaining the proper perspective.

CHARLES R. STINETTE, JR.

Religion and Economic Responsibility. By Walter G. Muelder. Scribner, 1953, pp. 264. \$3.50.

This is a book in the classical style of "social economy" as it was known in the days before economics became "scientific," i.e. before it was preoccupied with purely quantitative analysis and indifferent to the social and cultural ramifications of employment, prices, cost accounting, industrial management, and other economic processes. Dean Muelder is a man of independent and incisive mind, in matters theological as well as social, and this choice of subject for his Lowell Lectures guaranteed us his best thinking and most carefully formulated work. He makes effective use of current literature of a periodical kind as well as of more technical and historical sources. His style is a much more readable one for students and the general reader than we find in most works of its kind. Within the framework of a Christian world-view (usually implicit rather than explicit) the author guides the reader through a serious but compelling examination of Christian motives and vocation in economic life, the values at stake in labor-management relations, the problem of property ownership, social control issues, and ideological trends. He is consistently pragmatic rather than doctrinaire in his treatment, although there is an underlying "bias" towards socialist goals. It is the best single volume survey available about the American economic scene viewed from a Christian perspective.

JOSEPH FLETCHER

Real Life is Meeting. By J. H. Oldham. Seabury Press, 1953, pp. 80. \$1.50.

Here indeed is *multum in parvo*. The question at issue is this: "Can the Christian faith in this historical crisis do again what it did in the early centuries by saving and renewing a society not dissimilar to that which Augustine described as a 'rotting and disintegrating world'?" The first chapter delimits the primary realities of human existence:

God, Nature, Persons, Christ, Society, the Adversary, and the Power of Faith. The second deals with the recovery of the personal in its true meaning, as illustrated by the thinking of John Macmurray and of Martin Buber in *I and Thou*, and the third with the false alternative understanding illustrated by Nietzsche. Then two chapters on Christianity in an Age of Science and on the Gospel Drama and Society, by H. A. Hodges and Philip Mairet respectively, which are followed by Oldham's concluding chapters on a Fresh Approach to Christian Education and Planning for Freedom.

The chapters were originally published as supplements to the *Christian News-Letter*, and an introduction is provided explaining that they are addressed to the practical problem of how we shall move from the present situation to a society which "whether Christian or not, is at least compatible with the Christian understanding of life, and in which the Christian leaven is free to do its work." The book will bear close and repeated reading: it reflects profound and serious thinking, both analytical and constructive. The formulation of the right question is half the battle, and this book seems to the reviewer a significant attempt to formulate the Christian question about society.

HOLT H. GRAHAM

Christian Faith and Social Action. Ed. by John A. Hutchison. Scribner, 1953, pp. 246. \$3.50.

In this volume are thirteen essays by a group of scholars, teachers, and parish ministers whose orientation centers around Union Seminary in New York, and for whom Reinhold Niebuhr in particular is the lodestar. Included are two Episcopalians, Charles Kean and Clifford Stanley. While the book suffers from all of the weaknesses of symposia (variant style, lack of continuity and transition, conflicting premises) it nevertheless possesses high intrinsic interest for all Americans concerned with our domestic brands of Christian social thinking. (Incidentally the terms of "action" in these papers are almost entirely non-existent. They deal with non-operational matters of understanding social problems, judging all and any solutions, and reducing them to "ambiguities.") In effect it is a *Festschrift* to honor Dr. Niebuhr, who wrote the concluding essay in ignorance of the book's dedication. His own essay constitutes a succinct and summary statement of the final end-product of his many years of searching the middle terms between Christian faith and social policy.

The contributors are fairly unanimous in their distaste for liberal Protestantism and in favoring "neo-orthodox" principles; they appear to be unaware that there is any theological basis for social redemption in classical Catholic doctrine. In general they seem to be certain that Christian faith entails social concern, and concerned that it should not entail any certain political or economic conclusions. The group has held together (a strong influence ecclesiastically) since its start in 1930 as a Fellowship of Socialist Christians, plainly partial then to Marxian economic principles. By the end of World War II the Fellowship repudiated socialism and favored a moderate New Deal ideology. It then called itself the Frontier Fellowship. It has now been merged in a broader and less defined program called Christian Action, a kind of Protestant counterpart to Catholic Action in many parts of the Roman communion. Their outlook is now obviously pragmatic. As Dr. Niebuhr says, in explaining their departure from their former basis in definitive convictions, they think that events "have made the whole question of Christian social ethics more problematic . . . (and) the question is whether there are any criteria whereby we can judge between alternative movements." This is a significant and important book, for weal or for woe to all who hope that God's redemption reaches into the affairs as well as the hearts of men.

JOSEPH FLETCHER

Clothed with Salvation. A Book of Counsel for Seminarians. By Walter C. Klein. Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, 1953. pp. iv + 115.

A small book can sometimes be the gateway into a very large world. This is true of the present volume, not only for the theological students to whom it is primarily addressed, but also for those already ordained, who will find it profitable, if sometimes painful, reading (for the truth is often unpalatable), and for thoughtful laymen, concerned not simply with the ideal of the Sacred Ministry, but with the translation of that ideal into concrete reality.

There has long been a need for such a book as this, to enable those in seminary to get their bearings, while remembering their destination, to avoid the traps which lurk for the unwary (which means most of us), and to make use of the rich opportunities—personal, social, intellectual, and spiritual—which the divinity school affords.

The author writes out of a deep knowledge of the things of God and at the same time a keen penetration into the heart of man, with its un-

limited capacities for self-deception, and out of sympathetic awareness of the special temptations which those who are preparing for the priesthood encounter. Every page, every paragraph, bears witness to the solid theology behind it—above all the spiritual theology, the lack of which is so painfully evident today. That does not mean that the reader has to wind his way through a jungle of theological terms and phrases. Far from it. Dr. Klein has a knack of translating profound truths into clear, trenchant, and understandable English. The freshness and originality of the approach are reflected in the freshness and originality of the style. What he says about prayer, about mutual love and compassion, about sin and repentance, about worship, about vocation, will repay careful reading by a much wider audience than that to which it was first addressed.

At times one is tempted to take issue with the author—for example when he seems to intensify what some of us regard as an overemphasis (in our Ordinal) on a *conscious* vocation to the priesthood. One might wish, in connection with the subject of the development of prayer, for something to be said about acts of the will as an alternative to discursive meditation, such as those found at the end of Fr. Baker's *Sancta Sophia* or the "Jesus-prayer" of the Orthodox. But then one remembers the limitations of space and time, and is both surprised and grateful at the amount of sanctified uncommon sense and spiritual nourishment packed into a slender volume. It can hardly fail to act both as a light and as a spur toward the supreme objective—the subjugation of our wills to the will and the glory of God.

WILLIAM H. DUNPHY

Römische Religionsgeschichte. Bd. II. By Franz Altheim. Baden-Baden: Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft, 1953, pp. 347. DM 38.25.

This is a revised, enlarged, and very *de luxe* edition of Altheim's important History of Roman Religion. (Vol. I was reviewed briefly in the A.T.R., Vol. XXXV, Jan. 1953, 77f.) The first edition was in three small volumes in the *Sammlung Götschen*, 1931-33. In 1938 appeared Harold Mattingly's excellent English translation, for which Professor Altheim had rearranged the contents and added more material. The present new—and definitive?—German edition is a still further rearrangement and amplification of the work. It is to be followed by a third volume which, presumably, will trace the history during the later classical period.

At a first reading, one has the impression that Altheim has given us only a series of interesting essays on certain major points in the history; this, together with a number of critiques and comments on the views of other scholars—somewhat as a lecturer might present successive phases of his subject, and comment on recent books as he goes along. But a rereading brings out the architectural structure of the work: Altheim is insisting on certain principles of interpretation, and also certain overlooked data, which are of primary importance for the understanding of the subject in its real continuity—and discontinuity. Partly, of course, discontinuity is inevitable, in view of the fragmentary state of the sources at our disposal: compare the similar situation in the New Testament, and during the “tunnel period” of early church history. Even Greek religion, the best documented of the ancient religions, cannot be studied all round; and as Martin Nilsson insists, the history cannot yet be written.

The divisions of this new volume are significant. It opens with 168 B.C., when a new epoch began in Rome's history (cf. A.T.R., XXXIV, 12f.); it concludes with a survey—partly a preview—of the first two centuries of the Empire. The four main divisions deal with (1) the Change in Mental Direction (the depreciation of myth, the great individual, i.e. Hannibal, the slave revolt, and the oriental religions); (2) the Change in the Times (Caesar's religion, the end of the Republic, Hortensius and Sallust, Pollio, Virgil's First and Fourth Eclogues); (3) the Augustan Age (*Consensus omnium*, Augustus, the religion of the Augustan age, *Almus Sol*, the fall of Ovid); (4) Interpretations (Horace's interpretation, Livy and the causes of Rome's greatness, *Fatum* and *Fortuna* in Lucan, Virgil and Tacitus, *Sine suo capite membra*, and the Neronian fire at Rome).

Ennius was not the only one who neutralized and denatured the old myths and legends, but certainly from his time onward the educated took Euhemerism increasingly for granted. The gods were now only great and good men who had died and gone to heaven. The impact of Hannibal was another factor in the undermining of the traditional religion: much as the invasion of the Holy Land by heathen armies did something to the ancient and inherited eudaemonism of Hebrew religion. The slave uprising was another factor—the slaves were mostly orientals, many of them Semites, and their religious ideas and ideals were totally foreign to the ancient Roman cultus. These factors provided the inducement and also the material for the invasion of Rome and Italy by the oriental cults: that is to say, social and political, not

purely emotional and intellectual factors were at work (see esp. pp. 54f.). The process began a long way back, long before the first two centuries of the Empire. Livy describes the situation after the terrible disaster at Cannae in 216 B.C., when it looked as if Hannibal would soon control all of Italy (Bk. XXV, 1.6-8): "The longer the war dragged on, and the ups and downs of the conflict changed the hearts of men as much as it did their fortune, various superstitious cults, mainly of foreign origin (*tanta religio, et ea magna ex parte externa*), swept into the city to such a degree that either gods or men [i.e. both?] were suddenly changed. Not only in secret, now, and within private walls, were the Roman rites abandoned, but even in public, in the Forum and on the Capitol, where there was a crowd of women who no longer followed the ancestral customs either in sacrifices or in prayers. Petty priestlings and prophets had also captured the minds of the men. . . ." This is the point at which the oriental cults made their first entry; they came in via a social-political crisis in the history of the state and its cultus, and they came via the lower classes, chiefly non-Romans, non-Italians. From then onwards, it was the destiny of Roman religion to be completely transformed, eventually out of all recognition, though the process took several centuries before it was complete.

I wish there were more space in which to review the book in full, as it deserves; at least let me call attention to two other new and fresh viewpoints—Ovid's fall was not really due to some moral delinquency on his part, nor even to his knowing too much about the misbehavior of certain members of the imperial family, but was the consequence of his general lack of sympathy with the new régime and its determined stand on the subject of the old religion: for the very safety and welfare of the state, now, the old forms must be restored and maintained, and frivolous dabblers like Ovid (his *Metamorphoses* were scandalous to the newly orthodox) must be banished. A not altogether unlikely thesis! Another interesting chapter deals with the fire at Rome under Nero, and refutes certain theologians' efforts to emend the text of Tacitus. When will theologians learn that there are some areas of human knowledge where adroit homiletical devices will not do, where a lifetime of careful study is required before one's judgments are worth listening to, and where textual emendation is only the last desperate resource of the interpreter!

FREDERICK C. GRANT

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

Gottes Ruf im Alten Testament: die alttestamentliche Botschaft im Lichte des Evangeliums. By Walther Eichrodt. Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1951, pp. 128.

The wide recognition of Dr. Eichrodt's preëminence in the now crowded field of Old Testament theology makes the inaccessibility of his work to English readers doubly regrettable. To know him in the original is to realize how much other scholars have borrowed from him. The book before us is based on lectures prepared for a teachers' conference. Taking five of the principal themes of Old Testament faith as they are exhibited in as many familiar scriptural passages, the author relates each of them in turn to the totality of God's Word. It is an impressive performance, and the reviewer has found much profit in seeing how Dr. Eichrodt does it.

W. C. K.

The Book of Ezekiel. Vol. I (chh. 1-24). By Julius A. Bewer. Harper. pp. 72. \$.75.

The Book of Ezekiel. Vol. II (chh. 25-48). By Julius A. Bewer. Harper, pp. 83. \$.75.

These two volumes in Harper's Annotated Bible are the last to be written by the late Professor Bewer.

They will presumably be followed by one on Daniel, to be completed by Professor Emil Kraeling, who was Bewer's devoted friend and disciple. This will complete the series on the Old Testament prophets, with which the O.T. division of the work began. The Bible text used in this work is the Authorized (or "King James") Version, the literary superiority of which is generally acknowledged. To

this text are added notes which bring the reader up to date in the fields of archeology, history, philology, history of ideas, and history of religions—to a certain extent even in theology (i.e. "Old Testament theology"). This is a decided advantage for the man in the street, who prefers the K. J. version but is at a loss to relate it to modern views, and who cannot resolve the obscurities of the K. J. all by himself. The work aims to bring to the ordinary reader, esp. the one who prefers the K. J. Bible, the results of modern scholarship. Much of the space is accordingly devoted to correcting the rendering of the original; it may be thought a pity that the terms of copyright prevented the use of a more modern translation (e.g. the R.S.V.)—but that would have meant sacrificing the literary advantage of the K. J. What the English speaking world greatly needs is a revision of the K. J. which did not modernize it, or, on the other hand, archaize it (the Revised Version of 1901 is in spots far more archaic than the K. J.! The men of 1611 would scarcely have recognized the language!), and which substituted better words and phrases only where they were called for, and kept the smoothness and prose rhythm of the classical Jacobean version. The men of King James were really first-class scholars: they had read Greek and Latin from childhood, and they read Hebrew easily as well. Had they possessed the textual and philological equipment of the men of today, their version would have been even more truly a *ktēma es aei*, needing no revision! Harper's Annotated Bible is a step toward such a moderate revision, which would be of superlative value for reading at public worship.

F. C. G.

Mercy and Sacrifice. By Norman H. Snaith. London: S. C. M. Press, 1953, pp. 126. 7/6.

New studies in the prophets are always welcome, and this little book by Professor Snaith is no exception to the rule. It is not a commentary on the Book of Hosea, but a series of essays on its principal themes. While the author offers no strikingly original solutions to the problems presented, his discussion is always stimulating. Among his conclusions are these: Hosea was probably the first of the "literary" prophets, as his position in the Canon indicates; the prophet's account of his unhappy marriage is genuine history, not allegory, but chapter three is probably a later addition to the book; the "hope passages" are mostly original and are a logical outgrowth of Hosea's doctrine of the love of God; Hosea, like the other great prophets, was against the sacrificial system as he knew it, but the idea of sacrifice, when properly understood, is nevertheless of great importance for religion. As is always the case with Professor Snaith's books, the word studies are a particularly valuable feature.

R. C. D.

The Book That Is Alive: Studies in Old Testament Life and Thought as Set Forth by the Hebrew Sages. By John Paterson. pp. x + 196. Scribner, 1954. \$3.50.

Dr. Paterson is an old hand at making the Old Testament intelligible, attractive, and useful to non-professional readers, and he does it very well. Would that we all had his gift! This new volume is full of acknowledged truths compellingly put. The ministers and lay people who have heard its various parts in retreats and conferences must have loved it. The reviewer loves it too, but he thinks such clichés as "we fail to see the wood

for the trees" (p. 2) are beneath a writer of Dr. Paterson's talent. One cannot help comparing "transcripts from life and slices of experience" (p. 7) with "a slice from life as it is lived, a veritable transcript from experience" (p. 11) and wondering whether these words are a marvel of style or merely a labor-saving device. Dr. Paterson has extraordinary things to say, and he should not be content with ordinary ways of saying them.

W. C. K.

Die Quellen der politischen Ethik des 1. Klemensbriefs. By Christian Eggenberger. Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1951. pp. 210.

Too much of this book is concerned with "proofs" that the I Clement we have is not the original I Clement and that it is dependent upon Josephus, Dio of Prusa, Pliny, Suetonius, Tacitus, and Plutarch. What the literary parallels really show is that Clement writes in a Roman atmosphere of political discussion and that many of his themes are derived from contemporary philosophical-rhetorical *topoi*. What Eggenberger is developing is an insight of Harnack: in I Clement the church treats the culture of the empire as due to the will of God and thus pronounces a death sentence on apocalyptic. In this regard it would have been better to treat more fully the contrast between the Apocalypse of John and this letter and coordinate both with their historical backgrounds.

R. M. G.

Truth and Revelation. By Nicolas Berdyaev. Harper, 1954. pp. 153. \$2.50.

The existentialist philosophy of one of the most eminent writers of our time is perhaps most clearly expounded in this new posthumously published work. "Is it possible to come to a conclusion about Christianity in spirit and in truth?" asks the author in his Introduction. "If we are

to look at the relation between truth and revelation philosophically, it can only be done by a philosophy which is based inwardly upon religious and spiritual experience, not by a rationalist philosophy but by an existential philosophy which recognizes that spiritual experience is primary," he concludes.

Revelation as an historical event is rejected. There is no truth in history, only "objectification". Revelation is a spiritual event, an inward existential meeting (p. 144). God is Truth, the ground of truth, therefore revelation as an inner meeting can be true and known to be true.

The author offers a provocative discussion of two forms of atheism as a necessary critique of the errors of Christianity. The "Godlessness of the day" is atheism grounded in the rationalism of the past. The "Godlessness of the night" is the present atheism growing out of irrationalism. Both have something to contribute in purging Christianity of "sociomorphism" and idolatry.

The student of Berdyaev will not be disappointed in this addition to what is now a veritable library from the pen of the religious genius of the thoroughly Russian but supra-national Berdyaev.

A. D. K.

Foolishness to the Greeks. By T. R. Milford. Seabury Press, 1954, pp. 112. \$2.50.

Chancellor Milford of Lincoln Cathedral in England here gives us the text of his addresses at the mission held at the University of Toronto two years ago. To the addresses he has added an opening sermon and appended a lecture delivered to the Philosophical Society of the university, in which he discusses the problems of Christian theology in its relation to the contemporary philosophical view known as logical analysis.

The book which includes this material

will be especially useful to college chaplains and others concerned for presenting the Christian faith on college campuses. Others too will appreciate the clarity, the emphatic insistence on a "lived" religious faith, and the understanding of the modern academic world, which mark Chancellor Milford's discussion. This reviewer finds only one point to criticize, but since he finds this in such a large number of recent volumes it is probably more his prejudice than a valid criticism. I profoundly dislike that manner of presenting the Incarnation in terms of divine "rescue expeditions," in Milford's phrase, which has the implicit corollary (which Milford himself does not assert) that the Incarnation is so much a genuine novelty that there is no continuity of divine-human relationship which both prepares for it and its crown and center in our Lord. But this is because I am a "Scotist" rather than a "Thomist" in regard to the Incarnation, I suppose. None the less, I feel strongly that in our modern age it is not right to succumb to the tendency to a theology of desperation!

W. N. P.

Lord Hear My Prayer. By Shirley C. Hughson, O. H. C. West Park, New York: Holy Cross Press, 1953, pp. 200. \$3.00.

This is a book of comments on the Collects of the Book of Common Prayer arranged in accordance with the Church Year and prepared for easy devotional reading. The author was the late Superior of the Order of the Holy Cross and a member of that Order for nearly half a century, during which time he preached in Churches throughout the land. The editor, Father Julian Gunn, O. H. C., states in the foreword, "He now stands as perhaps the greatest director of souls this Church has known; unquestionably he is its greatest author of ascetic theology." Certainly no one in the modern

era was more in demand as a leader of retreats and meditations.

Father Hughson was a man of simplicity, directness, and complete devotion. These qualities appear throughout this little book. No special learning is required to understand the meditations. Unusual insights appear, stemming from a life spent so largely upon his knees in prayer. His asceticism expresses itself not so much in "other worldliness" as in his lack of interest in or desire for anything in this life except the service of his Master.

There is an uneven quality in this book in that the first meditations seem to be the result of greater care and thought than the later ones. Perhaps it is inevitable that in any series of writings some should be better than the others, and the editor explains this by saying that "Advent appealed to Father Hughson more than any other liturgical season of the Church Year." However, this is a matter of minor importance. The thing that really counts is that devotional reading of these meditations should give a new appreciation of the Prayer Book Collects and definite aid in increasing one's own use of them as means of worship.

Two Collects were omitted by Father Hughson and the meditations thereon were written by the editor, who has adequately preserved the spirit of the others.

W. H. G.

Meditations in His Presence. By James W. Kennedy. Seabury Press, 1954, pp. 245. \$3.25.

This book naturally invites comparison with Father Hughson's *Lord Hear My Prayer*. However, it concerns itself not only with the Collects of the Church Year in the Book of Common Prayer as Father Hughson's meditations do, but also includes comments on the Epistles and the

Gospels. The author is the Rector of Christ Church, Lexington, Kentucky, has served also as Acting Executive Secretary of the Division of Radio and Television of the Department of Promotion of the National Council, and is now active in the Ecumenical Movement. The foreword is by Professor Massey H. Shepherd, Jr., who perhaps gives an adequate description by saying that the meditations are "concise and pointed examples of a moral interpretation directed towards an active and positive type of Christian living. They have the spirit and energy of our modern American scene, inclined, as it is, so much more to the 'active' as against the 'contemplative' tradition of our Christian faith. They are a summons against half-heartedness, indifference, and pessimism." This reviewer read the book, bearing in mind that the meditations were given originally as brief comments at parish celebrations of the Holy Communion, and found them very stimulating and helpful. It is clear that they serve equally well for private meditations.

In Father Hughson's book, the Collects were quoted in full. Here they are only suggested, and likewise a key sentence only is taken from the Epistles and the Gospels. This reviewer found himself wishing that the Collects had been quoted in full since this would make for easier reading in meditations; but the purpose of this book is to serve as a complement to the Book of Common Prayer and presupposes that the two will be used together.

The author has great facility in stating simply the fundamental truths of the Christian faith.

W. H. G.

Documents Illustrating Papal Authority. Ed. by E. Giles. London: S. P. C. K. (Macmillan), 1952, pp. xxi + 344. \$3.50.

In an age ever more appreciative of documentary evidence and translations of

source material, this much-needed book will have a resounding welcome. The editor is scrupulously fair, and gives the reader just the right amount of editorial notation. He surveys the field from A.D. 96-454, beginning with the First Epistle of Clement and ending with Leo after Chalcedon, and even balances the verdicts of secondary writers on some of the more critical texts. In fact a sub-theme within the notations is the Gore-Chapman controversy over some of the same documents.

There is patient and rewarding scrupulousness throughout the editorial work. All the crucial documents are here, and good measure of the lesser ones. Two of Mr. Giles' accomplishments stand out in this reviewer's opinion: the painstaking work on the various recensions of Cyprian's *Treatise on Unity*, and the "box-score" on the patristic interpretation of Matthew 16:18. Just for the record, the latter shows that through John de Launoy there were thirteen writers who taught "that the Church was built upon Peter, six who said it was built upon the apostles or their successors, twelve who said it was built upon the faith which Peter confessed . . . and three who interpreted the rock as Christ himself." Needless to say, St. Augustine is in all four classes. Taking it a step further, Mr. Giles puts his document-writers into six categories, namely: (1) The rock is Peter: Tertullian, Cyprian, Firmilian, Ambrose, Augustine, Philip, Leo and Paschasius. (2) The rock is the faith confessed by Peter: Hilary, Chrysostom, Cyril, Leo. (3) The rock is the saints or the bishops: Origen, Cyprian. (4) The rock is Christ: Jerome, Augustine. (5) The rock is the chair of Peter: Jerome. (6) The rock is Peter's successors: Augustine. No longer need we battle our way through the Ante-Nicene, Nicene and Post-Nicene monstrosities. Mr. Giles has built us the

better mouse-trap, and all worried seminarians can now set off for his clearing in the forest.

R. H. W., JR.

Ways to Psychic Health. By A. Maeder. Trans. by Theodore Lit. Scribner, 1953, pp. + 200. \$3.50.

Here is a book by a psychiatrist who also describes himself as a *pastoral counselor*. The author's enthusiasm for Christian faith as an integral part of therapy will probably scandalize those who use psychiatry to bolster their rigid positivism. Alphonse Maeder is a practicing medical therapist in Switzerland. He is reporting on selected examples of brief psychotherapy. The pastoral counselor will find help and encouragement in these pages—and a refreshingly new attitude toward treatment. For Maeder, therapy is essentially a "truly human relationship" predicated upon growth in honesty and utilizing the strength that comes from "returning and rest" in God. While it would seem that the doctor's methodology has not benefited from American psychiatry, its critical evaluation must be left to those who work in the same field.

Dr. Maeder's own coming to grips with Christian faith is felt in every area of his work. For some his methods may seem to be too directive, but it is clear that they come from a man humbled by the knowledge of his own fallibility. It is only on this basis of the mutual acceptance of limitations that real *rapprochement* can develop. Every man must come eventually to that place where his freedom "finds its natural boundary through a freely chosen dependence upon a higher power." For the author that Power is encountered in Christianity. "It is faith which binds man to God, and through Him to all creatures. In this way the true community comes into being."

It is to be hoped that this effort to interpret the task of therapy in terms of

Christian faith and wholeness will arouse further questions about our own uncritical acceptance of psychiatric pronouncements as "gospel truths."

C. R. S., JR.

The Rise of Methodism: a source book. By Richard M. Cameron. Philosophical Library, 1954, pp. xv + 397. \$4.75.

Here is no conventional "source book," but a well integrated narrative constructed out of such documents as the Wesley-Whitefield journals and letters, with a binding commentary aptly supplied by Prof. Cameron. The whole constitutes a vivid and illuminating account of the spiritual development of the leaders and the beginnings of the Societies down to about 1745.

P. V. N.

The Christian View of Sexual Behaviour. A Reaction to the Kinsey Report. By W. Norman Pittenger. Seabury Press, 1954, pp. 67. \$1.50.

Dr. W. C. Menninger has pointed out that a kiss is *not* just a kiss. What a difference the salutation of a French general and a mother's greeting, between the kiss of a returning husband and the kiss of Judas! Dr. Kinsey ignores this distinction by his preoccupation with physical contact between men and women. Professor Pittenger *emphasizes* the discrimination and concerns himself with setting such encounters in the whole life of God's human creatures. Briefly but adequately he treats of man's nature, the mystery of sex, the meaning of chastity, original sin, and, especially valuable to the unmarried, the control of sexual activity. This little book goes a long way toward "giving the background" which its author proposed for those in charge of the education of youth, something which will be more valuable than admonition, moral imperative, and the like.

H. H. H.

Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. Bd. V, Lfg. 16. Ed. by Gerhard Friedrich. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1954, pp. 961-1032 + viii. DM 4.60.

This is the concluding installment of Vol. V, completing the article *patēr* and cognates, by Schrenk and Quell, and *pachunō* and cognates, by K. L. and M. A. Schmidt (due to the illness of the elder Schmidt, his son has prepared the article for the press). The article *Father* covers a wide range of ancient law and custom, the real background of the biblical idea; it recognizes the liturgical use of the term in the Palestinian synagogue (many Christians still think that our Lord originated the term as a title for God!); also that "in heaven" does not emphasize transcendence (or origin!) but simply distinguishes the heavenly Father from the earthly. The art. is of immense importance for the student of N. T. Theology. The briefer one by Schmidt (*père et fils*) throws considerable light upon the idea of "hardening" in the N. T.—what J. Weiss called the *Verstockungsgericht* that had overtaken the non-Christian Jews. It is six years since Gerhard Kittel laid down his editorial pen, after twenty years of toil on the *ThWB*, and passed to his eternal reward. We congratulate Professor Friedrich upon the solid achievement of the days that have followed. The high standard set by the earlier volumes has not been lowered in the least.

F. C. G.

The Story of Jesus. By Theodore Parker Ferris. Oxford Univ. Press, 1953, pp. 123. \$2.30.

This is an excellently written series of talks on the significant episodes in the life of our Lord, by a priest who has long since established his reputation as a preacher of note. One hopefully notes the absence of argumentative disquisition, and

is rewarded by the lack of fancifully conceived material to fill up what are frankly recognized as lacunae in the records of the life of Jesus. Like holy scripture, from which it rarely strays, Dr. Ferris' book depends for its dynamic upon the stark simplicity of its narrative. The observations he makes, all of them provocative of thought, are made from the depth of his own commitment to the Lord of Life; nowhere is this more true than in his treatment of the Virgin Birth (pp.8f). Christian conviction unites with the best of critical scholarship to give us a book we need not fear to put into the layman's hands, knowing that herein he will encounter the important questions and will have an honest approach to handling them.

J. L. M.

A Faith to Proclaim. By James S. Stewart. New York: Scribner, 1953, pp. 160. \$2.50.

The chapters herein were the Lyman Beecher Lectures on Preaching, at Yale. The author's previous *Heralds of God* was on the preacher and his vocation; this volume is on "the content of effective preaching." It deals with the proclamation of the Incarnation, Forgiveness, the Cross, the Resurrection, and Christ; and it reflects not only the writer's skill as preacher (cf. *The Strong Name* and *The Gates of New Life*), but also his competence as a New Testament scholar. The book abounds with fine illustrative matter, and shows how contemporary biblical interpretation can play its part in the preacher's task.

H. G.

What is Religion? By Alban C. Widgery. Harper, 1953, pp. 323. \$5.00.

This book is a study in the philosophy of religion and is based firmly on the data of the world's religions. Its approach is both historical and compara-

tive. The meticulously objective method of the author merits special praise even though it leads to a consideration of Christianity as only one, albeit perhaps the "highest", of the religions of men.

The author's aim seems to be the development of a descriptive rather than a normative account of religion as it is, contra various forms of anti-religious thought, e.g. logical positivism on one hand and "neo-orthodoxy" on the other. On the whole, the effort is successful.

Dr. Widgery introduces his subject with two preliminary chapters: "Philosophy in General" and "Philosophy of Religion." He then proceeds to a systematic presentation of views of revelation, man, God, suffering and sin, redemption and salvation, worship, and finally ethics. The concluding chapter deals with "Meanings in Religion" under nine theses. A valuable appendix defines and nicely distinguishes a number of related and often confused disciplines; rational theology, natural theology, religious philosophy, philosophical theology, and philosophy of religion.

The author is professor of philosophy at Duke University and is distinguished for many previously published works in the field of the comparative study of religions. This recent book is notably free from the technical jargon peculiar to such a specialized field and, accordingly, will commend itself to a wide group of readers.

A. D. K.

Novum Testamentum Graece. Ed. Erwin Nestle. Stuttgart: Priv. Württ. Bibelanstalt, 1952, pp. 119* + 671 + maps. DM 3.80.

Not only is the pocket edition of Nestle available at low price, but also the wide-margin edition, on writing paper capable of taking notes in ink (at about \$2.50), and now, as a final triumph, a photographic enlargement in which the

type of the apparatus is about as large as that of the text in the other editions—a boon for tired eyes! And the price is only about \$3.00. Thus the Stuttgart Bible Society continues to place Bible students everywhere under grateful obligation to them!

F. C. G.

Hermès Trismégiste. Ed. A. J. Festugière and A. D. Nock. III. *Fragments extraits de Stobée, I-XXII*, pp. ccxxviii + 93. IV. *Id., XXIII-XXIX; Fragments divers*, pp. 150. Paris: Les Belles Lettres (95. Boul. Raspail), 1954.

The magnificent edition of the *Corpus Hermeticum* by Fr. Festugière and Professor Nock is now complete. The fragments, chiefly from Stobaeus, are virtually identical with those in Scott's edition, and follow almost the same numbering. But Festugière's text is far more conservative than Scott's, less altered conjecturally. As in Vols. I-II, the text is accompanied by a clear and even brilliant translation, by Fr. Festugière, and by notes to which a group of scholars have contributed. The Fragments found outside Stobaeus have been edited by Dr. Nock, translated by Fr. Festugière, and likewise annotated.

The introductory essays promised in Vol. I will not appear, their place having been taken by Festugière's great work, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, 4 v., Paris, 1944-54, and by his Uppsala lectures on *L'Hermétisme*, Lund, 1948. For the *Testimonia* the reader is referred to Scott's fourth volume, with one addition (see Vol. IV, p. 146 of the present work). Many of their texts have already been cited in the appropriate places. The new edition is a model of editing, and its contents a priceless collection of material for students of Hellenistic-Roman religion.

F. C. G.

Glauben und Verstehen. By Rudolf Bultmann. Vol. I. 2d edition. Tübingen: Mohr, 1954, pp. 336. DM 14 (pap.), 17 (clo.).

This is an unaltered reprint of the 1st edition, which has been out of print for some time; Vol. II appeared a year or two ago. The range of subjects is wide, but mainly within the area of New Testament research. The work provides a fine supplement to Dr. Bultmann's great work on *New Testament Theology*, now in a second edition in Germany, and soon to be complete in an English translation.

F. C. G.

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